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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
R&D investment strategies of firms: renewal or abandonment 
A real options perspective 
 
BY 
 
Pingping Song 
 
July, 2009 
 
 
Committee Chair: William C. Bogner,    Pamela S. Barr 
 
Major Academic Unit: Managerial Sciences 
 
          This research develops a real options perspective framework for firms‘ valuation of 
strategic investments. I propose that a real options perspective can provide an effective means of 
re-examining and revising firms‘ strategic investment decisions in general, and of making 
individual, investment-level abandonment decisions in particular. The principal purposes of this 
research are to explore whether firms make abandonment decisions in accordance with real 
options theory, and the relative strength of the traditional economic theory, the behavioral theory 
of the firm and real options theory in explaining firms‘ abandonment decisions. I develop a set of 
hypotheses in the context of firms‘ R&D investment strategies in the world chemical industry. 
Using U.S. patent renewal data, I empirically test the hypotheses. The results from the empirical 
analyses suggest that, 1) firms‘ actual innovation abandonment decisions are consistent with the 
predictions made from real options theory; and 2) a real options perspective provides better 
explanation of firms‘ abandonment decisions than traditional economic theory and the behavioral 
theory of the firm. Therefore, taking such a perspective allows us to better predict abandonment 
than the other models. In investigating whether insights from real options theory enlighten firm‘s 
abandonment decisions, this research contributes to the strategic decision making literature, real 
options research, RBV and dynamic capability research and innovation literature. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
            Today many industries are characterized by rapid changes in technology, 
ambiguous consumer demands and heightened competition. These changes are persistent 
and can be competence destroying such that firms can no longer earn above average 
return for a meaningful period of time based on a single innovation or advantage (Bogner 
& Barr, 2000). In order to pursue competitive advantages and thus sustain superior 
performance, firms have to undertake various strategic actions to keep pace with 
environmental changes and exploit market opportunities (Eisenhardt, 1989), to seek risk 
and innovation (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988), and to create new spaces that are 
uniquely suited to the firms‘ strengths (Hamel & Prahalad, 2005). 
Current strategy theory and research suggest that effective firms undertake a 
series of actions to gain and sustain competitive advantages, which are in turn, 
continually being undermined by changes in the environment (e.g., Ferrier, Smith, 
Grimm, 1999; Lee, Smith, Grimm, Schomburg, 2000; Makadok, 1998). Thus, firms 
exhibiting sustained competitive advantage are, in fact, constantly searching for new or 
improved basis for that competitive advantage. Theory and research also suggest that 
these firm actions need to be experimental-based, because it can be unclear what 
directions changes in the competitive environment will take (Weick, 1995). By taking 
such experimental actions a firm can learn more about the environment and the potential 
of these actions, and it can access a range of alternative opportunities to take in the future. 
These actions are consistent with action-based sense making, because when they are 
undertaken, managers have little knowledge ex ante about whether the actions will be 
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successful (Bogner & Barr, 2000). Such a series of experimental actions extend the firms‘ 
past investments and strengths into the future, and provide the firm with unique strategic 
positioning as compared to competitors employing different sense making schema 
(Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997).  
The risky and explorative nature of experimental-based actions implies that a 
portfolio of these actions will be necessary over time. Because environmental changes 
can create new growth opportunities or erode the profitability potential of previously 
attractive investments, adjustments in this portfolio need to constantly be made. Thus, 
firms must act as adaptive learners, making timely adaptations and adjusting their 
capability sets to exploit current and future market opportunities. Further, firms are 
constrained by limited resources, and managers are unable to manage an unlimited 
number of investments or businesses. In practice, therefore, most firms are pursuing 
many more projects and ideas than they can successfully execute (MacMillan and 
McGrath, 2002). Thus, firms have to regularly re-examine and re-arrange their 
investment portfolios. And it follows that how effectively firms conduct this re-
examination and re-arrangement of their portfolios will be a significant component on 
their ability to sustain competitive advantage in a dynamic environment. 
Timely abandonment of previously attractive investments is an important way to 
revise a firm‘s investment portfolio. In general, as Chang (1996) suggested, exit is a 
necessary component of a firm‘s search and learning process. It is a phenomenon that is 
common in dynamic competitive environment where exploration and innovation are 
critical, and effective entrepreneurship is highly valued. Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004) 
noted that it is not uncommon that firms abandon some markets and later enter related 
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markets to deploy their resources and capabilities. As all firm investments entail 
organizational resources and managerial attention, managing abandonment has important 
implications for firms. Firms need to terminate less attractive projects in a timely manner 
to limit the downside risk. In addition, timely abandonment is critical for firms to redirect 
valuable resources to those projects that can lead to greater return. Unsuccessful 
investments can comprise a significant proportion of all the investments that firms make. 
If firms are unable to effectively abandon less promising projects, they will be unable to 
focus their resources on the more promising investments. Thus, abandonment is not 
necessarily a rare and desperate management decision as it was regarded in the past. 
Rather, it can be a regular proactive choice linking resource allocation to superior 
performance. 
Strategy research has noted the importance of abandonment. Dating back to the 
seminal work by Cyert and March (1963) and Nelson and Winter (1982), the behavioral 
theory of the firm and evolutionary economics suggest that firms follow particular 
routines and search processes to identify strategic assets and make investments to 
upgrade their strategic assets. By doing so, firms seek to improve their competitive 
positions. During this evolutionary process, when firms find that some strategic 
investments are less promising than expected, they should terminate such investments. In 
his widely cited article, Porter (1996) pointed out that the essence of firm strategy is 
choosing what not to do. The resource-based view of the firm (RBV), and especially the 
dynamic capability research, suggests that firms consistently seek, acquire, and exploit 
their resources to attain competitive advantages and pursue superior performance (Barney 
1991; Teece, Pisano, Shuen 1997). While firms strive to develop and accumulate 
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valuable resources, it is also important for them to decide what not to do, including 
discontinuing some investments in which they have previously invested resources. For 
example, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) noted that the key to firm effectiveness in 
dynamic markets is a firm‘s ability not only to decide which processes to incorporate into 
ongoing routines but also to decide which processes to leave out. Siggelkow (2002) also 
argued that when firms are confronted with evolving market conditions, asset trimming is 
one of the core processes that firms engage in to create and elaborate core organizational 
capabilities.   
Although the literature has recognized the importance of abandonment, 
abandonment decision remains largely an unexplored area in the strategy literature. Staw 
(1993) noted that much of organizational theory can be reduced to two fundamental 
questions: how to get organizations moving, and how to get organizations stopped once 
they are moving. He suggested that while the vast majority of organizational studies 
focus on why and how organizations initiate action, more attention should be devoted to 
understanding of organizational termination decisions. Along these lines, Mahoney and 
Pandian (1992) pointed out that while the resource-based view predicts growth and 
diversification, a ―resource-based theory of divestment is clearly lacking‖. Indeed, little 
empirical research has been conducted in this territory. The studies that did examine 
divestment mostly studied abandonment decisions in the context of divesture of entire 
business units or product segments such as corporate divestment decisions, which are 
often linked to previous diversification (e.g., Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Chang, 1996). 
Hence, as suggested by Lowe and Veloso (2004), more research at the more granular 
level is needed to examine firms‘ abandonment decisions.  In this research I move from 
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the more common corporate-level strategic perspective and look primarily at the 
investment decisions that are components of business-level strategy. 
While at the firm level we can say that abandonment decisions are important for 
firm performance and firms should make effective abandonment decisions, at the 
individual investment level abandonment decisions are not always wisely made. Despite 
the normative literature that suggests firms should make timely decisions to abandon 
certain investments and pursue those that entail higher growth potential, research shows 
that abandoning ongoing investments poses substantial challenges to firms. Guler (2007b) 
argued that while the signals of progress are relatively easy to interpret when the projects 
perform well, signals of failure are ambiguous and complex. Therefore, she suggested 
that firms usually can effectively decide to continue successful investments, but it is 
much more challenging for firms to identify and abandon investments that are no longer 
economically justified.  
In addition, any decision that involves reversing a prior, public commitment 
involves cognitive biases that are not found in decisions to invest. Thus abandonment 
decisions take mechanics of distinctive traits when compared to investment decisions.  
I propose in this dissertation that a real options perspective can provide an 
effective means of re-examining and revising firms‘ strategic investment decisions in 
general, and of making individual, investment-level abandonment decisions in particular. 
I argue that in these situations real options theory can provide a better lens for the 
examination of investment value than traditional economic models such as Net Present 
Value (NPV) and the behavioral theory of the firm alone. Although there are difficulties 
for firms in reversing what has been done, using the real option lens can help firms 
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overcome or reduce cognitive and behavioral biases and thus help them make 
abandonment decisions more effectively. In the remainder of this dissertation, I will 
examine firms‘ investment abandonment decisions using arguments based on economic 
logic, the behavioral theory of the firm and real options theory.  
The main research questions to be explored in this dissertation are:  
1. To what extent do firms make decisions to abandon or keep investments 
in accordance with the predictions and prescriptions made from real options 
theory?  
2. What is the relative strength of the Net Present Value model, the 
behavioral theory of the firm, and real options theory in explaining firms’ 
abandonment decisions?   
 
 
            Although real options theory is conceptually rooted in finance, I approach these 
questions from a strategic management perspective. I borrow from the resource-based 
view (RBV), knowledge-based view (KBV) and search literature to help build my 
arguments. According to RBV and KBV, firms differ in their resources including 
knowledge and capabilities, and these resource differences can explain performance 
differentials across firms. As a firm‘s strategic investments can be considered as options 
on growth opportunities, the knowledge utilized in such investments has implications for 
the value of such options. In addition, the firm‘s knowledge asset position has influence 
on the value the firm can appropriate from the strategic investments. Therefore, 
knowledge heterogeneity may also lead to differences across firms in the valuation of 
similar investments.  
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            Real options theory in recent years has attracted increasing academic interest in 
the field of strategic management. Bowman and Hurry (1993) suggested that real options 
theory is an attractive framework to examine strategic decision making under uncertainty. 
Fruitful research using the real option lens has been conducted with respect to many types 
of strategic decisions, among which are joint ventures (Kogut, 1991; Kumar, 2005; Reuer 
& Tong, 2005), international entry (Reuer and Leiblein, 2000), equity partnerships (Folta 
and Miller, 2002), industry entry (Kim and Kogut, 1996; Folta and O‘Brien, 2004), and 
R&D investments (McGrath, 1997; McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). Some scholars also use 
other terms to refer to the application of real options theory in management studies, such 
as ROA (real option approach or real option analysis) (Kumar and Shyam, 2005; 
Bowman and Moskowitz, 2001), ROR (real option reasoning) (McGrath and Nerkar, 
2004), and ROL (real option logic) (Warner, Fairbank, and Steensma, 2006). Though the 
terms differ, they all refer to the same underlying conceptualization of strategic decision 
making being seen through a real option lens. 
          Most extant research applying real options theory in the field of strategic 
management has examined the adoption of new options, leaving the implementing of 
options under-studied. Even less research has been conducted on firms‘ abandonment 
decisions. Some scholars raise criticisms of this gap in the research and argue that 
abandonment is a critical aspect of real options perspective (Adner and Levinthal, 2004). 
They suggested that by not examining the abandonment decisions, the real option 
research does not offer a complete test of the theory and lacks persuading support in this 
vein. Importantly, because real options theory is being applied to managerial decision 
processes, its application to abandonment decisions is not merely applying the same 
 8 
procedure as an initial investment, and deciding not to invest, as might be suggested by a 
financial options perspective.  This dissertation responds to the call and seeks to examine 
whether real options theory can help us understand firms‘ investment abandonment 
decisions.  
 In this study I do not intend to explicitly calculate the value of specific options. 
Rather, I examine whether factors that impact option value are systematically related to 
the actual abandonment decisions in a manner consistent with predictions derived from 
real options theory. In doing so, I develop and empirically test a series of hypotheses in 
the context of R&D strategies, which represent a critical aspect of firms‘ strategic 
investment decisions.  
            In investigating whether insights from real options theory enlighten firm‘s 
abandonment decisions, this study seeks to make the following contributions to the 
literature.  
First, it contributes broadly to the strategic decision making literature.  The 
incorporation of a real options theory perspective into the strategic decision making 
literature in general, and abandonment decisions in particular, offers two important 
contributions.  First, it allows for the development of a more complete model of decision 
making than that offered by either economic models or behavioral theory alone.  
Economic models, such as NPV, have served as good normative models for decision 
making, but, as will be noted in subsequent chapters, they do not accurately reflect actual 
decision making behavior. The behavioral theory of the firm recognizes the biased and 
cognitively constrained nature of decision making in practice and so comes closer to 
predicting actual decision outcomes.  However, managers often make complex decisions 
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under conditions of uncertainty that have quite positive results, despite the biases and 
heuristics that behavioral theory claims should limit the effectiveness of decision making.  
This suggests that current models of decision making may be incomplete and that 
managers may use logics that help overcome cognitive limitations.  I will argue that real 
options reasoning can provide that logic.  If the findings from this study provide evidence 
that real options reasoning is used in abandonment decisions, along with economic and 
behavioral logics, then we will have moved one step closer to building a more 
comprehensive model of strategic decision making. 
The second contribution to the strategic decision making literature concerns 
avenues for future research.  If the results suggest that there is a significant relationship 
between the variables that determine option value and abandonment decisions, it raises 
the question of whether real options logic truly improves decision making.  Thus, my 
findings would open up an important new avenue of research that would seek to 
determine the relationship between real options reasoning and decision outcomes.  If such 
a link is found, it would move the role of real options logics in decision making from 
purely descriptive to a more prescriptive role.   
            This study also seeks to advance the development of real option research by 
empirically testing the application of real options theory in the implementation of firms‘ 
investment options. Although real options theory has attracted significant interest in the 
field of strategic management and considerable progress has been made, many scholars 
agree that empirical studies that validate the propositions of real options theory are still 
sparse. The implementing of real option abandonment decisions remains under-
researched, although it is a critical aspect of real options in general. 
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          Third, it contributes to innovation literature as I develop and test the hypotheses 
that emerge from real options theory in the setting of R&D investment decisions. In spite 
of widespread attention to firm innovations in the form of patents, little is known about 
how firms manage their innovation portfolio through the abandonment of patents and the 
research trajectory that they represent. The use of real options theory provides new 
insights into the valuation of firms‘ R&D investments and patent abandonment decisions. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter I 
present the theory background and develop a set of propositions about investment 
valuation and thus abandonment. Chapter Three develops a series of hypotheses on firms‘ 
R&D investment abandonment decisions. Then Chapter Four presents the research 
methods, explaining my use of logistic analysis to empirically test the hypotheses in the 
context of the world chemical industry using U.S. patent data. Chapter Five reports the 
hypotheses test results. In Chapter Six I present the discussion, implications, limitations 
and future research.  
 
CHAPTER TWO  
THEORY DEVELOPMENT  
In this chapter, I will compare the arguments about investment valuation derived 
from traditional economic logic, behavioral theory of the firm, and real options theory. 
Then a series of propositions will be developed. 
 
II. 1. Economic logic 
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            Traditional economic theory assumes that managers are fully rational and make 
optimal decisions. The most popular traditional approach to valuating investments is the 
net present value (NPV) calculation, which is based on discounted cash flow (DCF). The 
reasoning is that an investment creates value for shareholders if the present value of the 
expected cash inflow exceeds that of the expected cash outflow. Namely, an investment 
should be made when the net present value is positive. NPV models assume that 
investment decisions are based on managers‘ rational valuation of the investments. The 
NPV valuation technique offers an economic rationale for investments and is widely 
applied.  
            However, this neoclassical investment model has both conceptual and 
implementation problems (Slater, Reddy, Zwirlein, 1998). Conceptually, the NPV 
approach gives limited consideration to uncertainty and does not adequately consider the 
value of embedded growth opportunities, thus it tends to devalue those investments that 
do not produce clear, measurable cash flow streams. In addition, the NPV approach takes 
a static view and fails to consider management‘s ability to revise their decisions in 
response to subsequent unanticipated market developments, which can cause cash flows 
to deviate from original expectations (Ross, 1995; Trigeorgis, 1993). As a result, the 
NPV approach tends to under-value explorative projects and long-term strategic 
investments (Haley and Goldberg, 1995; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Stein, 1996).  
In addition to these conceptual problems, implementation problems with the NPV 
approach include inaccuracy and bias in forecasts of cash flow, and the use of an 
inappropriate discount rate. As managers are only boundedly rational and have limited 
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information processing ability (March and Simon, 1958), the calculation of net present 
value will often be meaningfully inaccurate because of the inappropriate inputs.  
In light of the above, it is not surprising that many observed managerial behaviors 
are inconsistent with the expectations that come from a pure NPV model (Dixit, 1992). 
Firms that solely rely on NPV models may abandon investments that entail valuable 
opportunities. As a result, NPV models do not provide satisfactory prescriptive or 
descriptive models for explaining firms‘ abandonment decisions. Bettis and Hitt (1995) 
pointed out that when the environment is competitive and changing, reliance on such an 
approach is like a corporate ritual rather than an appropriate decision technique. In 
particular, NPV models tend to undervalue longer-term strategic investments and ignore 
the embedded growth opportunities. This is because strategic investments are usually 
characterized by exploration to a certain extent and are frequently confronted with 
significant uncertainties. Thus, firms using NPV models to evaluate strategic investments 
are inclined not to invest in projects that are of negative NPV but can be promising in the 
future. Even firms that have been successful in the past may fail to adapt or adopt new 
technology that will meet customers‘ unstated or future needs and will eventually fall 
behind (Christensen, 1997). Therefore, firms tend to prematurely terminate investments 
that might otherwise be profitable. This is analogous to type II error in research (Guler, 
2007b). 
Proposition 1:  
Traditional NPV models can undervalue strategic investments and lead firms to 
abandon such investments too early. 
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II. 2. Behavioral theory of the firm 
The behavioral theory of the firm emphasizes the actual process of decision 
making. Behavioral theory of the firm scholars criticize the neoclassical economic theory 
for assuming profit maximization and internal efficiency, and ignoring the most 
significant features of the organizational process, i.e., the process of actually managing 
the factors of production (Simon, 1982). The analytic assumptions of perfect rationality 
are not just incomplete, but are misleading as they are contrary to the actual processes 
that firm managers use to make decisions in complex business situations.  
The behavioral theory of the firm is consistent with economics logic in the sense 
that the behaviors of organizations are considered as actions performed by coordinated 
agents to achieve their goals, but it insists on coming to terms with cognitive limits 
(Mahoney, 2006). In contrast to neoclassical models such as NPV that assume decision 
maker rationality and optimal decision making, the behavioral theory of the firm suggests 
that managers are only boundedly rational with limitations in information processing and 
that they make satisficing decisions (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). As pointed out by Bromiley (2005), while the traditional 
capital investment literature frames the investment problem as selecting among well-
defined projects, real projects are rarely clearly defined and there are no cash flow 
forecasts attached. Therefore actual managerial evaluations of investments are not strictly 
made from the economics models. Greve (2003) showed that firms‘ R&D expenses and 
innovation launches are influenced by firm performance and slack resources, consistent 
with predictions derived from the behavioral theory of the firm. Sometimes firms can 
even do the opposite of what the economics literature suggests (Bromiley, 2005). 
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The bounded rationality and limited information processing capacity assumptions 
are more realistic and can better describe organizational behaviors compared to the 
neoclassical theory in which decision makers are regarded as fully rational. However, 
managers‘ decision biases impact their investment evaluations and can lead to decisions 
that are irrational in an economic sense. It can be hard for firms to identify investments 
that are no longer justified and decide to terminate such investments, although the ability 
to do so is critical for a firm to pursue investments with significant growth potential. 
Scholars have come to the observation that the challenges associated with abandoning 
investments can be even greater than those associated with initiating investments (Garud 
and Van de Ven, 1992; Adner and Levinthal, 2004). 
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that organizational factors lead firms to 
develop inertia and thus firms tend to continue doing what they have been doing (March 
and Simon, 1958). Because of internal organizational factors, firms are inclined to keep 
those investments that have been initiated by making follow-on investments. A prominent 
manifestation of organizational inertia is the observation that ―exploitation drives out 
exploration‖ (March, 1991). This will lead to learning traps that favor specialization and 
inhibit experimentation (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993), competency traps 
that impede an organization from accumulating adequate experience with a newer and 
eventually superior procedure (Levitt and March, 1988), and obsolescence in knowledge 
development (Sorenson and Stuart, 2000). As the result, the firm‘s competitiveness in the 
long run is harmed.  
All the above dysfunctional outcomes can result from decision biases. In the 
following sub-sections I develop in further detail two types of biases that influence firms‘ 
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valuation of strategic investments and, in particular, can bias decisions to abandon 
investments: escalation of commitment and uncertainty avoidance. 
 
II. 2. 1. Escalation of commitment 
Escalation of commitment is a decision bias that has attracted sustained attention 
in organizational theory. Strategic investments are typically courses of actions associated 
with a series of decisions rather than isolated decisions. There are times when a decision 
maker has invested in a project or course of action and the project goes poorly. The 
literature shows that there are many instances in which decision makers in these 
circumstances become locked into a losing course of action. They may commit more 
efforts and resources even when the additional investment is not expected to pay off, or 
persist in the course of action despite the signal of failure. Such a situation is referred to 
as escalation of commitment. There may be a tendency for decision makers to become 
locked into losing situations so that they are ―throwing good money after bad‖ (Staw, 
1981). 
Both individual and organizational decision makers exhibit undesirable decision 
commitment and face difficulties in terminating investments or courses of action. Early 
research on escalation of commitment research mostly concerned individuals and most of 
the evidence was collected through laboratory studies (e.g., Brockner, Rubin, and Lang, 
1981; Corlon and Garland, 1993). Organizational scholars, however, have also found 
evidence of commitment escalation in organizational decision making (e.g., Staw, 1976; 
Staw and Hoang, 1995; McNamara, Moon, and Bromiley, 2002). For example, Garud 
and Van de Ven (1992) suggest that managers focused on a particular project may see 
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greater potential in the pursuit of the project and become dedicated to the initiative. In a 
series of research studies, Staw and his colleagues found that decision makers may 
become over committed to a course of action as they seek to recoup their losses and 
justify their previous decisions (Staw, 1976; Staw and Fox, 1977; Staw and Ross, 1978) 
or to conform to the norms of consistency (Staw and Ross, 1980). McGrath (1999) also 
suggested that managers can become over committed because they are unwilling to admit 
error or failure. 
Therefore, although traditional economic theory suggests that investments should 
be continued if future benefits are greater than future costs and otherwise be abandoned, 
escalation of commitment leads decision makers to keep an investment open even though 
it is ―throwing good money after bad‖. By doing so, firms are likely to commit type I 
errors (Guler, 2007b), as they may fail to terminate investments that are no longer 
economically justified. 
Proposition 2: 
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that escalation of commitment often 
leads firms to fail to abandon investments in a timely manner. 
 
II. 2. 2. Uncertainty avoidance 
The behavioral theory of the firm literature suggests that both individual and 
organizational decisions may be biased toward uncertainty avoidance, in the sense that 
the decision makers tend to choose alternatives with foreseeable outcomes. Ellsberg‘s 
experiments (1961) showed that people generally avoid ambiguous choices. Curley, 
Yates, and Abrams (1986) found that if decision makers anticipate that others will 
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evaluate their decisions, the decision makers tend to choose clear alternatives and avoid 
ambiguous alternatives because they believe that such alternatives are less justifiable than 
clear ones. At the organization level, Cyert and March (1963) argued that organizations 
typically exhibit uncertainty avoidance in the actual process of organizational decision 
making: organizational goal, expectation, choice and control. They suggested that 
uncertainty avoidance is a basic principle of firms‘ general choice procedures. 
Organizations try to avoid the need to anticipate events in the distant future. They tend to 
use decision rules emphasizing short-run actions and short-run effects, rather than 
anticipating long-run uncertain events. 
Strategic investments have effects on performance in the long run and are often 
characterized by significant uncertainty. As a matter of fact, strategy is largely about 
resource allocation when the resulting impact on performance is not clear. The 
uncertainty avoidance bias, therefore, tends to make firms reluctant to allocate resources 
to longer-term strategic investments. Consequently, firms inadequately initiate long-term 
and explorative strategic investments, and tend to be biased toward projects with lower 
uncertainty when valuating ongoing investments. Thus the decision makers are more 
inclined to continue those investments with clear and certain payoffs. As a result, they 
may commit type II error, terminating explorative investments that are of higher 
uncertainty, even though they may be rewarding in the future. This leads to the following 
proposition and it is going to be contrasted with real options perspective later. 
Proposition 3a: 
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that firms are overly inclined to 
abandon investments with higher uncertainty. 
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Bounded rationality as well as cognitive and behavioral biases constrain and 
shape organizational decisions (e.g., March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). 
These behavioral and cognitive biases may lead to decisions that are irrational in an 
economic sense. The decision errors in investment termination can be either type I error 
(failing to abandon investments which are no longer economically justified and should be 
terminated in a timely manner), or type II error (abandoning investments which are of 
high potential and should be kept). From a normative perspective, however, organizations 
should avoid such biases and decision errors. Organizational decision makers are experts 
in their fields and thus should use their expertise and experience to strive to avoid such 
decision errors. Also, as the survival of firms depends on effective business decisions, 
those firms that repeatedly exhibit decision errors should be selected out of the 
environment in the long run (Knez, Smith, and William, 1985; Smith, 1989). Thus, firms 
need to look for ways to avoid strategic decision errors and improve the efficacy of their 
decision making.  
Although the behavioral theory of the firm explains some variance between 
observed managerial decisions and economically rational ones, it is descriptive and does 
not offer decision making approaches for overcoming these biases through the institution 
of alternative decision processes or routines. Therefore, by itself the behavioral theory of 
the firm has limited prescriptive insight and cannot be relied on to prescribe what 
decisions managers should make or how they should make them. Further, while 
subsequent research that takes a behavioral theory prescriptive has offered some methods 
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to improve decision making, they have focused primarily on the decisions to invest and 
have not addressed investment termination. 
These observations lead naturally to the question: How can managers ensure 
sound decision making and improve their effectiveness in making decisions, while also 
reducing such biases and errors? In the following, I propose that real options theory can 
be used to improve managerial decision making prescriptions by overcoming the 
weaknesses of both the NPV perspective and the behavioral theory of the firm, and, in 
turn, may be a better predictor of organizational decisions.  
 
II. 3. Real options theory 
Recent research suggests that a real option lens might usefully complement the 
traditional approaches to evaluate firms‘ strategic investment decisions (Mitchell and 
Hamilton, 1988; Kogut, 1991; Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Trigeorgis, 1996; McGrath, 
1997; Slater, Reddy, Zwirlein, 1998). Originating in the finance literature, real options 
theory presumes information asymmetries, path dependence and uncertainty (Miller, 
1998). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) in their book, Investment under Uncertainty, offer an 
excellent survey of how real options theory advances the understanding of evaluation of 
explorative and risky projects relative to the traditional approaches. Unlike an NPV 
model that sets investment thresholds (i.e., at NPVs=0) ahead of the investment, real 
options theory accommodates the process of retrospective sense making and the 
management‘s ability to revise their investment decisions. In contrast to the static view of 
NPV, real options theory takes a more flexible and dynamic view because it values the 
ability to preserve management decision options in the future. Further, it provides a set of 
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decision rules that managers can utilize to avoid biases. Therefore, real options theory 
may reveal valuable insights that traditional approaches fail to provide for managerial 
decision making. 
In the following, I will give a brief introduction to financial option theory and the 
use of option theory in strategy research, and then apply real options theory to investment 
valuation. 
 
 
II. 3. 1. Financial option theory 
            Originating in finance, an option originally referred to special contractual 
arrangement that conveys the right, but not the obligation to purchase (call option) or sell 
(put option) an underlying asset at a preset price (exercise price, or striking price) in the 
future. As uncertainty exists about the price of the underlying asset, there is the 
possibility that the asset price may exceed the preset price so the call option is of positive 
value. Similarly, a put option is valuable as the price of the underlying asset may possibly 
fall below the preset price. There is phenomenal growth in option trading on organized 
exchanges since April 1973, when the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) 
became the first organized exchange for trading standardized option contracts. The option 
traded volume in 2006 at this Exchange surpassed 674.7 million contracts (CBOE 
website). 
            Option theory has become a significant component in the field of finance. It plays 
a major role in shaping the thinking in finance today because of its ability to assume the 
existence of considerable uncertainty and value flexibility. While the most common 
options traded on exchanges are options on stocks or bonds, many other financial 
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instruments have some option features. Indeed, much of corporate financial theory can be 
presented in option terms. In this view, common stock can be viewed as a call option on 
the underlying assets of a leveraged firm; risky debt, convertible debt, insurance, 
warrants, almost every issue of bonds and stocks may be thought of as options. Even the 
capital structure of the firm, capital budgeting, investment policy, mergers and 
acquisitions, spin-offs and dividend policy, can all be viewed in terms of options (Cox, 
Ross, Rubinstein, 1979; Copeland and Weston, 1992).  
Option pricing theory, therefore, is relevant to almost every area of finance (Cox, 
Ross, Rubinstein, 1979). Applications of option pricing theory in finance include but are 
not limited to dividend policy, spin-offs, divestitures, convertible debt and warrants, exit 
decisions, capital asset pricing, and arbitrage pricing (Copeland and Weston, 1992). 
While organized option markets have developed fast in the past few decades, option 
pricing theory also has undergone rapid advances in recent years. The most widely used 
and well-accepted option-pricing models are the Black-Sholes model (Black-Sholes, 
1973) and the binomial model. The Black-Sholes formula is considered one of the most 
important contributions in finance. It presents the price (thus the value) of an option as a 
function of five factors: the price of the underlying asset, the variance of the underlying 
asset, the time to expiration date, the exercise price, and the risk-free rate of return. Table 
1 gives a simple description of the predicted relationships. 
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Table 1 
Relationships predicted by Black-Sholes Model 
 Impact on option price 
the price of the underlying asset + 
the variance of the underlying asset  + 
the time to expiration date + 
the exercise price - 
the risk-free rate of return + 
 
            The binomial option pricing approach uses binomial distributions and was 
independently derived by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) and Rendleman and Bartter 
(1979). It usually involves numerical calculations that can be facilitated with computer 
simulation. The binomial option pricing approach predicts relationships between the 
impacting factors and the option price that are similar to the Black-Sholes model. As a 
matter of fact, the Black-Sholes model can be regarded as a limiting case of the binomial 
option pricing approach (Copeland and Weston, 1992). 
 
II. 3. 2. From financial option to real option 
Although options have an origin in finance, option features are not limited to 
financial instruments. Almost all assets are really certain types of contingent claims 
because most investment decisions entail ongoing uncertainty, incomplete available 
information, and the possibility of exercising future managerial discretion (Dixit, 1992). 
Thus, option features are pervasive in many managerial decisions. Almost all projects 
have option-like characteristics and can be thought of as options—they are referred to as 
―real‖ options, because they are options on operating assets as opposed to financial assets 
that are tradable on market. Flexibility and embedded growth opportunities are inherent 
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in many investment proposals, making options an important aspect of the decision. 
Option valuation is therefore relevant to many strategic decisions of firms. Ross (1995) 
actually suggests that all investment decisions should be treated as option valuation 
problems. By incorporating the value of such real options, decision makers of firms can 
facilitate many of their decisions such as business entry, strategic alliances, and R&D 
investments etc.  
            There are important differences between financial options and real options so 
financial option-pricing models cannot be directly applied to real options problems. For 
example, finance theories are based on assumptions of market efficiency and equilibrium, 
hence market prices are evaluated to exactly reflect the value of the asset, and these 
prices are readily observable on market. Thus, using the option-pricing model, the value 
of options on stocks and bonds can be calculated explicitly. However, real options cannot 
be easily evaluated in such concrete numbers, and the use of this financial option pricing 
methodology for real options is limited by various difficulties.  
            First, real options lack some of the explicit features of exchange-traded options, 
so the financial models can be problematic. One important concern is that financial 
options and real options differ in their assumptions about the distribution of the future 
prices (return) of the underlying asset (Bowman and Moskowitz, 2001). Option pricing 
models are based on different assumptions about the distribution of the underlying asset 
price. The Black-Sholes model, for example, assumes that the stock price follows a 
lognormal distribution with a constant level of volatility. Such assumptions about 
distribution, however, may be inappropriate for real options as the distribution of return 
can be quite lopsided.  
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            Second, firm specific resources and capabilities are commonly involved in real 
managerial decisions. These factors are not incorporated in the standard financial option 
valuation models. However, firm specific resources and capabilities can significantly 
impact the value the firm can realize through its strategic investments. For example, 
whether a firm has independently held complementary resources to expand in a target 
market affects the firm‘s valuation of a joint venture and accordingly the decision to 
acquire or divest (Kogut, 1991; Chi, 2000)  
            Third, like other quantitative models, there are a number of implementation 
problems related with quantitatively using the standard financial option pricing models to 
evaluate strategic real options (Lander and Pinches, 1998). Determining the value of 
inputs is challenging. The underlying asset of a real option is usually not publicly traded 
on active market; the asset price is thus not readily observable like a stock or bond price. 
Similarly, the future cash flow and the volatility of future return are difficult to predict; 
the risk-free rate of return may vary over the option‘s lifetime; the exercise prices for real 
options may not be known ahead of time. As a result, if the inputs are not calculated right, 
the valuation outcome derived from the option-pricing model is misleading.  
In addition, the standard financial option pricing models cannot be directly 
applied to a strategic real option without complicated customization of modeling. The 
mathematical solution of the customized pricing algorithm can be overly sophisticated for 
most corporate managers and thus limit its use in many firms. Furthermore, real projects 
often are collections of embedded options, making the explicit pricing almost impossible. 
Consequently, real managers rarely explicitly employ advanced real option pricing 
models in strategic decision making (Copeland and Keenan, 1998). Rather, firms most 
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likely use the real options perspective qualitatively to facilitate their strategic decision 
making. Along with other scholars in strategy, I am not proposing that the real options 
perspective be used as a substitute for traditional valuation methods. Rather, I argue that 
the real options perspective can be a useful complement to the traditional approaches. 
This is consistent with Bowman and Moskowitz‘s observation that using multiple forms 
of analysis can be advantageous and lead to sound decision as the different methods can 
act as a check on each other (Bowman and Moskowitz, 2001). 
 
II. 3. 3. Application of real options theory in strategy research 
Recent literature in strategic management provides support for the argument that 
many aspects of firm behaviors are consistent with real options theory. Kogut, one of the 
early advocates of using real option lens in strategy research, suggested that joint 
ventures are created as real options to expand into new product markets in response to 
future technological and market developments (Kogut, 1991). He argued that joint 
ventures are an attractive mechanism for investing in an option to expand in risky 
markets as joint ventures can share risks and decrease the total investment. The firm can 
exercise the option by acquiring the joint venture when the market for the technology or 
new product is proven. Thus he hypothesized that the timing of the acquisition should be 
triggered by a product market signal indicating an increase in the venture‘s valuation. 
Consistent with real options theory, he found that unexpected growth in the product 
market for the joint venture increases the likelihood of acquisition, but unexpected 
shortfalls in product shipments do not have significant effect on the likelihood of 
dissolution. Kumar (2005) also suggested that a joint venture confers the option to buy 
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(i.e., to acquire) and the option to sell (i.e., to divest) the venture. By keeping the joint 
venture, the firm maintains flexibility and keeps such flexibility options open. When the 
firm exercises the option to buy or sell, a joint venture is terminated through acquisition 
or divestment. He examined the impact of the acquiring or divesting of joint ventures on 
the value creation of a parent firm. Consistent with real options theory, Kumar found that 
ventures that are divested to refocus a parent firm‘s product market portfolio are 
associated with significant value creation, and that firms gain lesser value when they 
terminate ventures in uncertain and concentrated industries. 
            Using a real options perspective, Folta and Miller (2002) examined equity 
purchases of partner firms subsequent to initial minority equity investment. They argued 
that uncertainty, firm valuation, and the threat of preemptive rivalry influence the choice 
between flexibility and commitment. They hypothesized that the resolution of uncertainty 
for technologies motivates commitment decisions, and that when the underlying growth 
opportunity is at risk of preemption by rivals, greater uncertainty encourages commitment. 
Using data from minority investments in the biotechnology industry by established firms 
from outside of biotechnology, they found support for their hypotheses.   
McGrath and Nerkar (2004) applied real options theory to explore pharmaceutical 
firms‘ motivation to invest in technological areas new to the firm. They considered a 
firm‘s R&D activities in a new technological area as the adoption of a new option. They 
identified three constructs—scope of opportunity of a firm‘s first patent in a new 
technological area, the firm‘s prior experience in the area, and competition in the area. 
They argued that these constructs influence the firm‘s propensity to continue its R&D 
investment in the area. Based on an analysis of the patents of firms in the pharmaceutical 
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industry, they found that firms‘ investments in new R&D areas as reflected by subsequent 
patents in these areas are consistent with the arguments based on real options theory. 
 
II. 3. 4. Investment valuation with a real option approach 
Myers (1977) was the earliest to view a firm‘s discretionary future investment 
opportunities as growth options, or call options on real assets, arguing that the firm has 
the discretion to decide in the future whether it will exercise such options. He suggested 
that the value of a firm and any other investments can be broken into the cash flows 
stemming from assets in their current use and those stemming from their redeployment or 
future expansion. The latter cash flows are only realized if the assets are redeployed or 
future investment opportunities are actually exploited. Therefore, they entail the value of 
growth opportunities---- the value of growth options, or the option to grow (Kogut, 1991; 
Myers, 1977). In other words, the value of an investment (V) can be decomposed in terms 
of assets that are currently in place (VAIP) and the embedded growth options (VO):  
(1) V=VAIP+VO   
VAIP can be measured by the discounted current earnings on the assets in place. 
The growth option, VO, emphasizes the value of embedded opportunities to gain return in 
the future (e.g., Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001; Tong, Reuer and Peng, 2005). Researchers 
have found that many investments create future growth opportunities and can 
significantly contribute to growth option value. Investments in joint ventures, advertising, 
research and technology platforms can create highly valuable growth options (e.g., Myers 
1977, 1984; Kogut, 1991; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). Early investments can enable a 
firm to acquire a greater ability to expand in the future and to take better advantage of 
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future growth opportunities. For example, early R&D investments can lead to a new 
generation product or process; acquisitions can enable a firm to access new markets or 
strengthen desirable core capabilities.  
These early investments may lead to future competitive advantages, including but 
not limited to, technological advantage, brand name recognition by consumers and lower 
future production cost (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998). These potential opportunities 
enhance the value of the investments beyond the current earnings. Studies found that in 
many firms the value of their growth options represents a considerable proportion of the firm 
value (e.g., Strebel, 1983; Kester, 1984). For example, Kester (1984) found that many 
firms‘ growth option value can be over 50 percent of market value and some can be as 
high as 90 percent. However, traditional valuation approaches such as NPV fail to 
recognize this value, because the growth opportunities are embedded in the investments 
and there is no clear cash flow. In the following, I will examine what factors impact the 
valuation of the investment (V).  
According to the Black-Sholes model, the value of a stock call option is a 
function of five variables: the current stock price, the volatility of the stock price, the 
time to expiration date, the exercise price, and the risk-free rate of return. These variables 
are analogous to the features of real strategic investments. The current stock price for the 
call option is analogous to the value of asset in place in the real investment. The volatility 
of the stock is analogous to the variance of the return the firm will receive from the 
investment. The exercise price of a call option is analogous to the future expenditure 
needed by the firm to capitalize on the growth opportunities. The risk-free rate of return 
is analogous to the cost of capital of the firm. I argue that real options reasoning would 
suggest that by examining these features of the investment, firms can assess the 
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embedded growth option value and thus alleviate the behavior biases described in the 
previous section. 
Past strategy research on uncertainty‘s influence on decision making usually 
considered uncertainty as a disincentive for investments, as managers and investors strive 
to avoid volatility in performance. Even studies taking a real options perspective mostly 
emphasize the value of waiting over immediate investment when there is substantial 
uncertainty. Scholars have interpreted the empirical finding that uncertainty is negatively 
related with firm investment levels as powerful support of real options theory (Carruth, 
Dickerson and Henley, 2000; Guiso and Parigi, 1999). Option theory, however, also 
suggests that the variance of asset price increases the value of the option written on the 
asset. This can be illustrated by the valuation of stock call options: the higher the 
volatility of stock price, the more likely the stock price may exceed the exercise price in 
the future. As option holders keep the upside potential but limit the downside risk, they 
receive the payoffs from the positive tail of the probability distribution. Therefore, 
although a rise in the volatility of an asset decreases its market value, it will increase the 
value of the option written on the asset (Copeland and Weston, 1992). This feature of 
options has important implications for managerial decisions about investments. Recent 
research actually has begun to indicate that higher uncertainty can mean greater 
opportunity for future growth rather than simply larger risk, and thus encourages 
investments (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998). 
When valuating new investment initiation such as industry entry, a firm needs to 
consider two types of real options embedded in the investment decision: the option to 
defer and the option to grow (Folta and O‘Brien, 2004). The former option addresses the 
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value of waiting and the latter address the growth potential. The relative value of the two 
options determines whether the investment is taken or not. Folta and O‘Brien suggested 
that while the two types of options have opposing impacts on the investment decision, 
both options increase in value with increasing uncertainty. As a result, the net impact on 
the investment decision can be ambiguous. In most cases, before the investment is 
undertaken, uncertainty increases the value of the option to defer more than the value of 
the option to grow (Folta and O‘Brien, 2004), so uncertainty often leads firms to wait. 
For an existing investment, however, the option to defer entry is killed and the firm 
obtains an option to grow once the investment is made. Therefore uncertainty of the 
return will increase the value of the option to grow and thus lead the firm to keep the 
investment. Recalling equation (1), I expect a positive relationship between uncertainty 
and the value of the investment: 
Proposition 3b: 
Real options perspective suggests that firms are less inclined to abandon 
investments with higher uncertainty, ceteris paribus. 
 
This proposition contrasts with the behavioral theory of the firm and Proposition 
3a above. The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that managers and firms typically 
exhibit uncertainty avoidance, which describes what is really happening in managerial 
decision making process. Thus, Proposition 3a is a descriptive argument about managers‘ 
actual behaviors. 
Proposition 3b, however, suggests that, all else being equal, the higher the 
uncertainty of the return on an investment, the less likely it will be abandoned. This is 
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because real options theory indicates that such an investment can be highly valuable. 
Thus, this proposition is a prescriptive argument telling what the right decision is in a 
given situation. It predicts the impact of uncertainty on investment valuation in the 
opposite direction as in Proposition 3a, which comes from the behavioral bias of 
uncertainty avoidance. Therefore, I suggest that using real options theory can help to 
overcome or alleviate the uncertainty avoidance bias, and thus reduce the likelihood of 
committing type II error. 
While traditional economic theory only considers assets that are currently in place, 
real options theory also counts the value of embedded growth opportunities. This portion 
of investment value is not captured by traditional economic theory. Therefore taking a 
real options perspective helps firms to reduce the possibility of under-valuation of 
investments and thus reduce the type II errors that occur from traditional economic 
models such as NPV. 
Proposition 4: 
Taking a real options perspective in investment valuation can help firms alleviate 
the problem of too early abandonment found in traditional NPV models. 
 
Due to escalation of commitment, it is difficult for firms to terminate their 
investment projects once started. Based on the behavioral theory of the firm, I propose in 
Proposition 2 that escalation of commitment often prevents firms from abandoning 
investments in a timely manner. Proposition 2 is a descriptive argument about what will 
most likely be observed in managerial decision making. If firms take a real options 
perspective and re-examine their projects accordingly, however, they will be able to 
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assess whether these projects are still economically justified. Therefore, they can make 
abandonment decisions when it is needed, thus reducing the possible type I error due to 
commitment escalation. 
Proposition 5: 
Taking a real options perspective in investment evaluation can help firms 
overcome the commitment escalation problems predicted by behavioral theories. 
 
Taken together, we have traditional economic models such as NPV approaches, 
and we also have behavioral theory and real options theory, all of which predict firms‘ 
investment abandonment decisions. The traditional economic theory is normative, which 
is about making the ideal decisions. Economic models, however, assume that the decision 
maker is fully informed and fully rational, able to compute with perfect accuracy such 
that the ideal decisions can be made. Such assumptions do not hold true in real 
managerial decision making process of firms. Therefore the economic models do not 
validly apply to the actual decision making process. The behavioral theory is descriptive, 
describing what is actually happening in firms‘ managerial decision making process. The 
decisions actually made are not necessarily optimal or in the best interest of firms, due to 
bounded rationality and behavioral biases. Real options theory is prescriptive in that it 
attempts to identify what the right decision is given the actual restrictions that firms have. 
Thus, I suggest, by using the real options perspective, managers can improve the efficacy 
of their decision making. 
I do not suggest that real options theory should drive out the traditional economic 
theory or the behavioral theory. These theories are complementary rather than substitutes 
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for each other. Each theory addresses different aspects of managerial decisions and can 
add variance explanation. So, using behavioral theory of the firm and economic theory 
together can better explain organizational behaviors than either does separately, and 
combining three theories together we can achieve even better fit in models of investment 
valuation. 
 
CHAPTER THREE  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Schumpeter (1942), in his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy pointed 
out that innovation is critical for the creation of private wealth, social welfare and 
economic growth. Since then an impressive body of literature has justified the positive 
impacts of innovation on firm performance in terms of productivity growth (Bean, 1995; 
Geroski, 1989; Goto & Suzuki, 1989), market share (Franko, 1989), profitability 
(Cannolly & Hirschey, 1984; Geroski et al., 1993; Roberts, 1999), market value (Lerner, 
1994), adaptability and long-term competitiveness (Geroski et al., 1993; Mobey, 1988). 
As strategic management research focuses on understanding differentials in performance 
across firms (Helfat, 2000), study of firms‘ R&D investment is a key part of strategy 
research. 
Though the statement that innovation is a key to superior performance in today‘s 
competitive business environment is far from controversial, innovation is characterized 
by extensive exploration and frequently confronted with significant uncertainties. As a 
result, valuation of a firm‘s innovation investment targets is often difficult. The 
traditional approach to evaluate R&D investments with the NPV calculation is not 
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adequate. In this chapter, based on the propositions and arguments in the previous chapter, 
I develop a series of testable hypotheses on why firms abandon investments already in 
existence. 
To operationalize the propositions, I examine firms‘ R&D strategies and consider 
their innovations as real options. R&D investment strategy of firms is an appropriate 
context to apply real options theory. As pointed out by Bowman and Moskowitz (2001), 
real options theory advances our understanding and evaluation of risky and explorative 
projects and encourages experimentation and proactive exploration of uncertainty, which 
is a revolution in thinking. Scholars have agreed that real options theory is promising in 
its potential contribution to a theory of firm innovation (McGrath, 1997; Mitchell and 
Hamilton, 1988; Miller & Arikan, 2004). The presumptions of real options theory on 
path-dependency and uncertainty describe realistic circumstances for managerial decision 
making about R&D investment. Real options theory values flexibility, which is valuable 
under uncertain conditions but is often ignored in traditional valuation approaches. Thus 
models incorporating a real options perspective can more closely align with managerial 
practices regarding R&D investment. By using real options theory to study organizations 
we should become better at prescribing and predicting managerial decisions about 
innovation that are actually made and therefore advance a theory of firms‘ R&D 
investment strategies that may also generalize to other investment decisions.  
            A firm‘s R&D investments are investments in future opportunities. These 
innovation investments confer growth options that the firm hopes will lead to a 
competitive advantage. They are parallel to financial call options in many ways. Take 
stock option as an example. Investors purchase a stock call option because the stock price 
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may exceed the exercise price. Similarly, firms invest in R&D projects because they 
believe they may be able to earn returns from the innovated technologies in the future. By 
undertaking the investments, both the stock option investors and the firms acquire the 
right to exercise the option but they do not have further obligations. If stock price does 
exceed the exercise price by expiration date, investors can choose to exercise the stock 
option by purchasing the stock at the previously specified exercise price. Similarly, firms 
can exercise their growth options by leveraging the technologies in production or 
licensing the technologies. If the stock price does not exceed the exercise price by the 
date of expiration, stock option holders will let their stock options expire without taking 
any further action; likewise, firms may abandon some of their innovations if such 
innovations do not turn out to be very useful.  
            From a real options perspective, when firms are making decisions as whether to 
keep or abandon an R&D investment, they assess the value of the investment, which 
includes both the asset in place and the value of the embedded growth option. Then they 
abandon those with lower valuation. By doing so, firms are able to redirect valuable 
resources to more fruitful R&D activities. Unlike the evaluation of initiating new projects, 
which would be the adoption of new options, the evaluation of ongoing investments for 
abandonment decisions involves giving up positions resulting from previous investments. 
The forces governing the two types of valuation differ in importance. While limiting the 
downside risk is the governing force for the decision as to whether to defer an investment 
initiation, for valuation of the investment in existence the upside potential of the 
investment, i.e., the growth option value, is the primary governing force (Dixit, 1992). 
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There is one critical distinction between an R&D investment as real option and a 
financial option in terms of the abandonment of these options. The stock option holders 
face an automatic expiration simply by taking no further actions: they just do nothing and 
the stock options expire.  They do not need to make further decisions as to these options. 
Managers, however, do not have such an ―automatic stopping event.‖  They have to make 
explicit decisions to end the R&D investment and give up current positions proactively. 
For example, they have to decide that no more resources will be allocated to the 
investment. This sharp contrast with financial options is at the heart of the economic and 
behavioral issues associated with the abandonment of real options. 
In the development of the hypotheses, I use arguments from traditional economic 
theory and behavioral theory of the firm in addition to real options theory. From the 
perspective of traditional economic theory, the value of assets in place, i.e., the current 
earnings, is the index used to make the abandonment decision. From the behavioral 
theory perspective, I identify two constructs that influence the abandonment decision: 
escalation of commitment and technological uncertainty (explorativeness). From the real 
options theory perspective, I identify five constructs that impact firms‘ abandonment 
decisions.  Two of them are also found in the other two perspectives: the value of assets 
in place as represented by current earnings and technological uncertainty 
(explorativeness). Three others are distinctive to real options theory: scope of innovation, 
knowledge depth and knowledge complementarity. The hypothesis concerning current 
earnings based on real options theory is consistent with conventional NPV models. As to 
technological uncertainty (explorativeness), the behavioral theory of the firm and real 
options theory suggest competing hypotheses. I favor the real option hypothesis, arguing 
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that the real options perspective can help firms overcome behavioral bias, so it is 
prescriptive. I argue that using the NPV model only, or using the behavioral theory of the 
firm only, can lead to over-estimation or under-estimation of innovations, and that using 
real options theory can overcome or reduce such biases and result in more effective 
abandonment decisions. 
            Figure 1 gives a simple conceptual summary of the forces impacting the 
innovation abandonment decision. Each of these factors will be developed in the 
following pages. I am not going to calculate the option value explicitly or directly 
examine the impact of the option value on the abandonment decision. Rather, I will test 
the impact of the factors that influence the valuation of the innovation on the 
abandonment decision. Of these factors, knowledge depth and knowledge 
complementarity are at firm level and the other factors are all innovation specific. 
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III. 1. Innovation specific factors 
III. 1. 1. Current earnings 
Traditional economic theory suggests that the value of an investment can be 
measured by calculating the discounted cash flow. Of the discounted cash flow 
approaches, NPV models are the most popularly used. Conventional NPV models suggest 
that the value of an investment is the present value of earnings from assets that are 
currently in place. An investment is justified if the present value of the cash inflow is 
larger than the present value of the cash outflow. Thus, the greater the discounted current 
earnings from an innovation, the more likely the firm is going to keep the innovation 
rather than abandon it.   
From the real options perspective, the value of an innovation consists of the value 
of asset in place plus the value of growth options, as shown in Equation 1. The value of 
asset in place captures the NPV of current earnings from the innovation. The value of 
growth options may represent a significant portion of the total innovation value. 
Option theory indicates that the higher the price of the underlying asset, the more 
valuable an option written on it. Thus higher current earnings of an innovation implies 
that the growth opportunity embedded in the innovation is more valuable. This prediction 
is consistent with NPV valuation approach. Both terms of Equation 1 have greater value 
with increase in current earnings. Accordingly, an innovation with higher current 
earnings is more valuable and the firm is more likely to keep it alive. Thus I come to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  
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The more current earnings an innovation has, the less likely the innovation will be 
abandoned.
                                                                   Figure 2 
 
III. 1. 2. Escalation of commitment 
Although most early studies of commitment escalation have concerned 
individuals and were conducted in laboratory experiments, recent research has started to 
lodge the research in organizational context. As noted above, one of the distinguishing 
factors of real options versus financial options is that real options on R&D investment or 
the like often require proactive behavior on the part of management. Research has found 
that organizational decision makers also have difficulties in making abandonment 
decisions and thus organizations may exhibit escalation of commitment. For example, 
Ross and Staw (1993) examined the escalation of commitment in the Shoreham Nuclear 
Power Plant, which wasted billions of dollars. Staw, Barsade, Koput (1997) and 
McNamra, Moon and Bromiley (2002) examined escalation in banks‘ commercial 
lending decisions. From the literature I discussed below I identify two sociocognitive 
factors that can lead to commitment escalation in investments: sunk cost and anchoring.  
 
III. 1. 2.1. Sunk cost 
Sunk cost refers to resources already invested in a project. According to 
traditional economic theory, a rational decision maker should only consider incremental 
costs and returns when he faces a choice between continued investment in a project or 
Current earnings Likelihood of 
abandonment 
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termination of the investment. Objectively, the prior investment in the project should not 
impact the decision. However, research suggests that sunk costs, the investments already 
made in the project, may influence the decision to continue investment in an ongoing 
project. Arkes and Blumber (1985), for example, found that subjects are more willing to 
invest more funds in an ongoing project than in new project start up. In addition to the 
dichotomous effect of sunk cost, Garland (1990) found that the amount of sunk cost is 
positively related with the investor‘s willingness to continue investment in the project. 
Research has suggested multiple theoretical explanations for the sunk cost effects: self-
justification (Staw, 1981; Teger, 1979), the desire not to waste resources already invested 
(Arkes & Blumer, 1985), and information-processing heuristics of framing of decisions 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980; Whyte, 1986). 
Because of the sunk cost effect, when managers make decisions in an 
organizational context prior investment in a project may increase the firm‘s commitment 
to the project. The larger the amount of sunk cost, the more biased the managers may be 
toward continuing an ongoing project, even in the face of negative feedback. 
The resources a firm has spent in an effort to develop and deploy an innovation 
are the sunk cost of the innovation. Such investments are usually innovation specific and 
irreversible. The more the firm has invested in the innovation, the more prominent the 
sunk cost effect may become. The managers will have more motives to keep the 
innovation alive for self-justification of the prior input. They may think that ―victory was 
just around the corner‖ (McNamara and VanDeMark, 1995) and consider abandoning it 
would be a waste of the already invested resources. The managers‘ framing of 
abandonment as loss results in a tendency to continue committing resources to the 
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innovation, even when the feedback is not positive. These lead to biased decision of 
undesirable commitment: 
Hypothesis 2: 
The more sunk cost there is in an innovation, the less likely it will be abandoned. 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
III. 1.2.2 Anchoring 
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that managers respond to the 
subjective environment that they perceive rather than the objective environment that they 
―really‖ face (Simon, 1982). Therefore, much as managers‘ behaviors are influenced by 
their subjective perception of the environment, the investment decisions of organizations 
are impacted by managers‘ perception of the value of the investment. As a result, if 
managers‘ perception of the value of the investment is subject to cognitive biases and 
heuristics, the managers will make biased investment decisions. 
Sociocognitive literature has observed that managers have difficulty in changing 
beliefs. Once beliefs are developed, subsequent information processing tends to be biased 
in the direction of the preexisting belief (Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, 1984). People often 
selectively filter information and interpret new information so as to maintain their beliefs 
(Fiske, 1991).  
A common example of belief based bias is anchoring. ―Anchoring‖ refers to the 
phenomenon that different initial values yield different estimates and that the final 
Sunk cost Likelihood of 
abandonment 
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estimates are biased toward the starting point, so there is ―insufficient adjustment.‖ 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that judgment under uncertainty exhibits 
anchoring and insufficient adjustment. People in many situations make estimates of likely 
outcome by starting from an initial value and adjusting this value to yield the final answer. 
The initial value, which acts as a starting point, may be given or it may be the result of 
some incomplete computation made by the people who make the estimates. In any case, 
people typically make insufficient adjustments based on the initial value. 
Another cognitive heuristic, overconfidence, can make the anchoring effect even 
larger. Psychological literature shows that many people are often overly confident about 
their own relative abilities and are unreasonably optimistic about their futures (e.g., 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Weinsten, 1980; Taylor and Brown, 1988). Such an 
optimistic bias is referred as overconfidence. Camerer and Lovallo (1999), for example, 
found that overconfidence leads to excessive business entry. They found that even when 
people accurately forecast competition and negative industry profits, they may decide to 
enter anyway because they believe their firm will succeed while most others will fail. The 
authors suggested that this can be one of the explanations for the high rate of business 
failure. While overconfidence may lead to excessive new business initiation, it also 
makes it hard for managers to terminate their existing investment projects. Because the 
decision makers may believe that, despite the unfavorable signals, they are still able to 
generate considerable returns, they may become more reluctant to adjust their initial 
expectation of the project. 
Firms initiate innovation investments because they expect that the investments 
will produce positive returns. As time passes, some projects turn out to be less promising 
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than expected. Consequently, the managers ideally should revise their investment plan 
accordingly, abandoning those projects for which the economic value is no longer 
justified. Anchoring, however, may prevent managers from abandoning those projects in 
a timely manner. Holding feedback constant, the higher the initial expected future value 
of an innovation, the greater the adjustment that is needed for the managers to identify the 
real value.  
In the light of the above, anchoring and insufficient adjustment tend to lead firms 
to stick to their prior expectation even when the signals are unfavorable and thus fail to 
terminate projects that are no longer justified. This applies to firms‘ innovation strategies; 
the managers‘ initial expectation of the usefulness of an innovation will impact their 
decisions between termination and persistence. The higher the initial expectation of an 
innovation, the more likely the managers will tend to keep it. 
Hypothesis 3: 
The higher the initial expectation of an innovation is, the less likely the innovation 
will be abandoned. 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
The remaining hypotheses are mostly based on the real option reasoning, which 
suggests that the higher the variance of the future returns on an innovation, the more 
valuable the growth opportunities embedded in the innovation. This is analogous to stock 
option pricing. When the downside loss is fixed, firms‘ investments increase in value 
Initial expectation Likelihood of 
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with increase in variance of returns, which means that the firms can access a greater 
range of potential upside outcomes. As Dixit (1992) pointed out, the upside potential to 
produce future earnings is actually the primary force that governs abandonment decisions. 
Therefore, innovations that have high variance in future returns should be more valued 
from a real options theory perspective, while such innovations are less valued using 
conventional approaches.  
There are various types of factors from different sources impacting a technology‘s 
value, including the adoption and diffusion of new technologies, market and customer 
acceptance, and competitors‘ strategic actions (Rosenberg, 1996). In this study I identify 
and study four factors that influence the value of a firm‘s innovations: explorativeness of 
innovation, scope of application, firm‘s knowledge depth and knowledge 
complementarity. The first two factors are technology specific, and the latter two describe 
a firm‘s knowledge portfolio effect. 
 
III. 1.3. Technological uncertainty (explorativeness) 
As novel recombination of knowledge elements, innovations are characterized by 
significant uncertainty on the technology side. Technological uncertainty is an important 
aspect of uncertainty that innovations are faced with. When firms generate new 
innovations, they do not know for sure how useful the innovations may become in the 
future. I examine the explorative degree of innovation to denote the uncertainty of the 
return on the innovation from technological sources.  
Innovations differ in the degree to which they are explorative: some innovations 
are oriented to employing and refining existing technological solutions, and other 
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innovations are more oriented to seeking new technological alternatives. They represent 
exploitation and exploration respectively as illustrated in March (1991). As exploitative 
innovations refine existing solutions, they conserve cognitive effort and resources and 
can lead to more predictable outcomes. There may even be the impulse to build on 
existing problem solutions in the context of innovation in general (Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001). Explorative innovations, however, have less predictable future returns. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the behavioral theory of the firm suggests 
that firms typically make decisions in a manner that limits uncertainty. Therefore, when it 
comes to innovation strategies, the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that firms are 
inclined to keep exploitative innovations and abandon explorative ones. 
Hypothesis 4a: 
The more explorative an innovation is, the more likely it will be abandoned. 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
Real options theory, however, suggest the opposite: technological uncertainty 
increases the value of an innovation because higher uncertainty means higher growth 
option value. Explorative solutions to a problem are more risky than exploitative ones 
that build on technological antecedents (Hoskison, Hitt, and Hill, 1993; Hoskison, Hitt, 
and Ireland, 1994). However, experimenting with new solutions may lead to radically 
different innovation that is highly useful and fuels additional applications. 
Explorativeness 
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Explorativeness thus implies an increase in the variability of outcomes; it can result in 
failure but could also result in a significant breakthrough (Fleming, 2002). 
Thus, higher explorative degree implies higher growth option value of an 
innovation. But it may take more time for the innovator as well as the market to 
recognize the true value of explorative innovations than for the exploitative ones. When 
the potential of an explorative innovation is unclear, waiting for further discoveries about 
the innovation has positive value. Therefore a firm will be inclined to keep such an 
innovation rather than abandon it in order to avoid losing the potential growth 
opportunities. 
Hypothesis 4b:  
The more explorative an innovation is, the less likely it will be abandoned. 
 
 
Figure 6 
I expect that H4b is more likely to be consistent with actual managerial behaviors, 
because the upside potential is the primary force that governs abandonment decision for 
ongoing investments (Dixit, 1992). It would be very interesting to see whether actual 
managerial behaviors reflect the behavioral theory or real options theory. If Hypothesis 
4a is supported, it shows that the descriptive behavioral theory is true but managers make 
suboptimal decisions. If Hypothesis 4b is supported instead, it suggests that we need to 
question the degree to which behavioral theory reflects managerial decision making.  
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III. 1.4. Scope of application 
            Scope of application is another technology specific characteristic of an innovation. 
A technology may be applied in more than one type of product or activity. Here I define 
scope of application as the degree to which an innovation can be leveraged in multiple 
products or activities. An innovation‘s scope of application may positively affect the 
variance of return on an innovation for three reasons.  
            First, a technology with a wide scope of application can be deployed in multiple 
products or activities simultaneously and thus generate higher return in total for a firm. 
Second, and relatedly, such a technology is a relatively more generalizable asset, thus it is 
more likely to be able to be leveraged by other firms at the same time. Therefore, in 
addition to leveraging the technology itself, the firm may also generate revenue by 
licensing the technology to other firms. Third, there are embedded switch options. As 
Moore (1994) suggests, ―Many times the pioneering innovation is primitive, initially 
serves a specialized niche, and the most important use may not be the one envisioned.‖ 
Berger, Ofek and Swary (1996) also show that generalizable assets produce more salvage 
value than specialized assets. When the innovated technology does not prove to be highly 
valuable in the originally desired use, the firm can still apply this technology in other 
fields, though it may need to end the original usage. As a result, an innovation with wide 
scope of application entails some flexibility for the firm, which is very valuable under 
uncertain circumstances according to real options theory. Therefore, an innovation with 
wide scope of application has higher growth option value, and a firm is more willing to 
keep it when information about the full value of the innovation is limited. 
Hypothesis 5a:  
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The wider the scope of application of an innovation is, the less likely it will be 
abandoned. 
 
However, there are also difficulties that managers will have to value and to really 
reap the benefit of application scope. To realize benefits from a wide scope of application 
may require additional coordination as well as complementary resources including 
technological knowledge, making such a task challenging and costly. Firms are limited in 
their knowledge breadth (Ahuja & Katila, 2002) so they may lack the ability to capture 
the marginal benefits from wider application scope of innovations. Although innovations 
with wide application may entail greater flexibility with embedded switch options, firms 
face obstacles in managing the switch options to harvest the flexibility benefits (Kogut, 
1989; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Huchzermeier & Cohen, 1996, Tong & Reuer, 2007). 
Therefore, the firm that owns the technology and other firms may not be able to really 
exercise the embedded growth opportunities and reap the growth option value. Also, it 
can be complicated and costly to utilize the innovation in multiple products and activities 
so that the potential gains will be offset or even over weighted by the cost. Thus because 
of the firms‘ bounded rationality and limited resources including information processing 
capability we reach an alternate hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 5b:  
The wider the scope of application of an innovation is, the more likely it will be 
abandoned. 
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Figure 7 
 
III. 2. Firm level factors 
This section builds on real options theory while also bringing in other theory 
background, the Resource Based View and in particular, the Knowledge Based View and 
dynamic capability arguments. In addition to the innovation specific factors discussed 
above, firm differences may impact abandonment decisions. Because firms are 
heterogeneous in their resources and knowledge, each firm may perceive the value of an 
innovation quite differently. As Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo (1997) proposed, the 
heterogeneity of firms‘ abandonment decisions should be of particular interest to strategy 
researchers. Folta & O‘Brien (2007) have suggested that an examination of firm 
resources provides the basis for enlightening this heterogeneity. Guler (2007a) also found 
that firm level differences are significant predictors of firm actions, especially in 
unsuccessful investments.  
I examine how a particular type of resource, a firm‘s knowledge portfolio, 
impacts its innovation abandonment decisions. KBV suggests that the key resource of a 
firm is its bundle of knowledge assets, and that the firm can build competitive advantage 
through the effective management of such knowledge assets (Grant, 1996; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). Firms develop and apply knowledge in multiple technological areas, and 
engage in multiple R&D projects. Because firms integrate and deploy their knowledge to 
Scope of 
application 
Likelihood of 
abandonment 
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create value, the return a firm can generate from its innovations is thus associated with 
the firm‘s pool of knowledge.  
The dynamic capability literature also suggests that a firm‘s knowledge asset 
positions not only shape the firm‘s competitive advantage, but also impact the 
accumulation of the dynamic capabilities of the firm (Helfat, 1997; Teece et al, 1997). 
This further supports the argument that when firms evaluate their innovations, they 
should not only examine the technological content in the focal innovation itself, but also 
consider the firm‘s other resources especially its knowledge assets. The firm‘s current 
knowledge asset will therefore impact the firm‘s evaluation of the innovations, its 
investment in resource development and its R&D trajectory, and its innovation 
abandonment decisions. 
This logic leads to another advantage of using real options theory as compared to 
conventional theories. Conventional theories based on cash flows typically assume 
independent evaluation of investments. Thus, those approaches ignore the joint effect of 
investments on future return but treat the value of investments as largely additive 
(McGrath & Nerkar, 2004). Real options theory perspective, however, allows interactions 
between investments. For example, Vassolo, Anand and Folta (2004) observed that there 
are potential sub-additive or super-additive interactions among real options investments 
due to redundancies in outcomes and fungible inputs respectively. In the following I 
identify two characteristic traits of a firm‘s knowledge portfolio that impact the variance 
of return on an innovation for a firm: knowledge depth and knowledge complementarity. 
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III. 2.1. Knowledge depth 
            I define knowledge depth as the degree to which a firm develops and accumulates 
knowledge within a specific technological area. By technological area, I refer to a 
technological domain in which the technologies share a similar function, use or structure. 
A firm‘s knowledge depth in a technological area can increase the variance of the return a 
firm can generate from its innovations in that area for the following reasons. First, a 
firm‘s innovations in areas where it has developed deep knowledge are likely to be more 
valuable than those in areas it is unfamiliar with. As the firm develops deeper knowledge 
in a technological area, it can better value new knowledge in that area. With familiarity 
and deeper understanding, the firm‘s ability to use the knowledge to innovate improves 
(Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Studies have shown that highly valuable innovations can derive 
from the new synthesis of well-known components (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Sahal, 1985; 
Utterback, 1994). Second, firms can better exploit their innovations in areas they are 
familiar with as they build up complex knowledge and insight; a firm can reuse methods 
or materials with greater efficacy (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Hoskisson et al, 1993). 
Third, firms are more likely to further extend their innovations to areas in which they 
have already accumulated substantial knowledge. RBV indicates that firms build their 
capabilities on what they are especially good at. As firms construct and accumulate 
knowledge through experience, their prior experience permits more efficient knowledge 
accumulation in subsequent periods (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, 1994; Henderson & Clark, 
1990). Helfat (1994) also found that firms tend to emphasize areas in which they have 
accumulated knowledge in the past. Consistent with these arguments, the dynamic 
capability view of the firm also suggests that deeper knowledge may facilitate both the 
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learning and application of knowledge and thus the firm may better realize its absorptive 
capacity to create or sustain its competitive advantage (Zahra and George, 2002). 
           Firms may perceive greater upside potential embedded in innovations in areas 
where their knowledge portfolios show a high level of knowledge depth and are inclined 
to keep such innovations. Therefore I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6:  
The depth of a firm’s knowledge portfolio in a technological area is negatively 
related to the likelihood that an innovation in that area will be abandoned. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
III. 2.2. Knowledge complementarity 
            Here I define knowledge complementarity as the degree to which the knowledge 
in different technological areas can be usefully combined. Two technological areas do not 
necessarily have to be close to each other in terms of technological specifics in order to 
have high knowledge complementarity. Rather, high knowledge complementarity 
between two technological areas implies that synergy may be achieved by combining 
knowledge components in these areas to generate valuable solutions. For example, 
Fleming and Sorenson (2001) found that it is easier and more fruitful to combine certain 
types of technologies than others.  
I examine the complementarity of a firm‘s knowledge portfolio at the level of 
technological area. If the knowledge in a technological area can be usefully combined 
Knowledge depth 
Likelihood of 
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with knowledge in other technological areas of the firm, then positive interactions are 
likely between the innovations in that area and the firm‘s knowledge in other areas. By 
tying the focal innovation with the firm‘s other technologies, it is likely that the firm can 
develop products of higher performance or generate new technologies of higher value 
than firms lacking the complementary technologies. Given an innovation, those firms 
without such complementary knowledge will be less able to discern application 
opportunities or fully exploit such opportunities. Firms with complementary knowledge 
therefore can access a wider range of growth opportunities and create greater value, 
which means greater absorptive capacity in the aspect of harvesting resources (Zahra and 
George, 2002). From the perspective of RBV, Knowledge complementarity can lead to 
competitive advantage as it meets the four criteria: valuable, difficult to imitate, 
unsubstitutable and not all firms have it (Barney, 1991). The firm‘s innovations in such a 
technological area thus tend to have a higher growth option value for the firm, making it 
worthwhile for the firm to keep these innovations.  
Hypothesis 7:  
The higher the knowledge complementarity between a technological area and a 
firm’s other technological areas, the less likely the innovations in that 
technological area will be abandoned. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
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The following is a summary of the hypotheses (1-7) and theoretical bases. 
  Independent variable 
Predicted impact on 
likelihood to abandon Level Theory 
H1 current earnings - innovation Economic, Real option 
H2 sunk cost - innovation Behavioral 
H3 initial expectation - innovation Behavioral 
H4a 
explorativeness 
+ 
innovation 
Behavioral 
H4b - Real option 
H5a 
scope of application 
- 
innovation 
Real option 
H5b  + Behavioral 
H6 knowledge depth - firm Real option 
H7 
knowledge 
complementarity - firm Real option 
 
Table 2. A summary of Hypotheses1-7 
 
As shown in Table 2, Hypothesis 1 is derived from both traditional economics 
theory and real options theory. Hypothesis 2 & 3 and Hypothesis 4a are based on 
behavioral theory, and the rest of the hypotheses are from real options theory. I do not 
claim that these theories are mutually exclusive. Rather, they address different aspects of 
managerial decision making in business context. Therefore, a model that includes all 
three perspectives should be better in predicting abandonment decisions than the other 
models.  
Hypothesis 1 addresses the economic rationale from conventional NPV approach, 
which considers the NPV of an innovation but tends to under-estimate its potential value 
in the future thus lead to type II error. I expect that a model with Hypotheses 1 through 3 
will better predict abandonment decisions than a model with Hypothesis 1 only, as 
Hypotheses 2 & 3 addresses managers‘ behavioral and cognitive biases. Such biases, 
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however, may lead managers to over-estimate or under-estimate the innovation value and 
cause type I and type II error. Further, a model with Hypotheses 4b through 7 added will 
even better prescribe the actual decision making of firms‘ innovation strategies. This is 
because by applying the real options perspective, managers can better judge the 
innovation value that includes the value of embedded growth opportunities, and 
overcome some of their behavioral biases. 
These expectations are formalized in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8:  
The model that incorporates the current earnings, sunk cost and initial 
expectation of an innovation has greater explanatory power on the likelihood of 
abandonment than the model that considers the current earnings alone. 
 
Hypothesis 9:  
The model that incorporates the explorativeness, scope of application, knowledge 
depth and knowledge complementarity has greater explanatory power on the 
likelihood of innovation abandonment than the model that only considers the 
current earnings, sunk cost and initial expectation. 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR  
METHODOLOGY 
IV. 1. Research setting 
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This study is interested in the cross-sectional variation in firms‘ valuation of 
strategic investments and subsequent actions. The hypotheses pertain to the variation in 
innovation abandonment decisions, and the factors that explain that variation. Therefore 
the hypotheses entail the regressing of the likelihood of abandonment on the specified 
factors. I use patent data to test the hypotheses in the setting of the global chemical 
industry. The chemical industry is appropriate for study of firm innovation strategies for 
the following reasons. Technological development is critical to the performance of 
chemical firms, and firms in chemical industry proactively innovate to gain competitive 
advantage. Chemical firms tend to aggressively patent their innovations and their patents 
are regarded as effective and are widely and consistently used (Ahuja, 2000). Levin, 
Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987) showed that while in some businesses patents may 
not necessarily reflect a firm‘s technical knowledge and R&D activities, patents are an 
especially important source of technological advantage in the chemical industry. Thus, in 
this industry patents are a meaningful indicator of a firm‘s innovative output (Arundel & 
Kabla, 1998; Levin et al, 1987).  
Patent data are widely used in management studies, as there are many advantages 
of using it. In addition to using patents as a measure of firm‘s innovative output, 
researchers also use patent data to measure firms‘ search behavior (e.g., Katila, 2002; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Patents are directly and closely related to innovativeness; 
almost all major innovations are patented with very few exceptions. Patent data provides 
a rich source of information for specific innovation, including identifying the technology 
classification, the applicant, the inventor, and as well as providing indication of 
knowledge development. And the data availability adds to its attractiveness as a data 
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source. Patent data are readily available from national patent offices and other databases. 
Another important advantage of patent data is that it represents an externally validated 
measure of innovation (Griliches, 1990).  
            There are some well-documented limitations of the use of patent data (Cohen & 
Levin, 1989), however. For example, not all innovations are patented. Firms may differ in 
their propensity to patent their innovations (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Griliches, 1990), and 
this difference is more significant across industries than within. These problems can be 
solved by a research design limited to a single industrial sector in which patents are a 
meaningful indicator of innovation, as I have done here. By doing so, the researcher can 
control for inter-industry differences in patenting propensity as the factors that affect 
patenting propensity are likely to be stable within a specified intra-industry context 
(Basberg, 1987; Ahuja, 2000). 
 
IV. 1. 1 Patents as real options that provide potential returns 
Firms proactively engage themselves in creating new technological innovations in 
order to pursue competitive advantages. In many industries, firms resort to patent systems 
to protect and exploit their property rights to such innovations. Firms can exercise their 
patent rights in three ways: by litigating, licensing or leveraging (Teece, 1998).  
Litigation is the enforcement of intellectual property rights. When the firm 
holding a patent finds that the patent has been infringed, the firm can litigate by suing the 
infringing firm for lost royalties and damages (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 
2003). Licensing, the second type of exercising a patent, is the partial sale of such 
intellectual property rights (Gallini & Wright, 1990). A firm can license its patents to 
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other firms for royalty payments, or cross-license the patent to other firms and receive in 
exchange the other firm‘s technology (Grindley & Teece, 1997). The third type of patent 
right, leveraging, is typically exercised through internal corporate venturing.  Here the 
firm commercializes these patents by developing and introducing new or enhanced 
products into market on its own (Block & MacMillan, 1993).  
Patents parallel stock call options in many ways. With a granted patent, a firm has 
the returns from current uses and the exclusive right to benefit from the patented 
technology in the specified period. While investors have the right to exercise stock 
options by trading the stocks at exercise price, firms have the exclusive right to exercise 
their patents rights through litigation, licensing or leveraging the innovated technologies 
into products and services. The investments that are needed to exercise the patent rights, 
i.e., to commercialize the patents, are analogous to the exercise price on the real option. 
The patent holding firm has the right, but not the obligation, to exercise these three patent 
rights. If the stock price does not exceed the exercise price, stock option holders will not 
exercise their options but simply let the options expire. Similarly, firms holding patents 
may choose to let the patents expire and abandon their patent rights, if they find that the 
patent entails inadequate current earnings and growth potential. I treat patents as real 
options in this study, consistent with prior research (e.g., Pakes, 1986; Teece, 1998; 
Nerkar, Paruchuri and Khaire, 2007).  
It is appropriate to regard patents as real options for the following four reasons: 
First, there is significant uncertainty about the returns to the patented technology. The 
value of a patent is revealed over time. Researchers have found that most patents are of 
little value and only a small number of patents turn out to be very valuable. Although 
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firms apply for patents for those innovations they consider valuable, at the time of 
application they do not clearly recognize the total potential of these innovations. 
Therefore there is still substantial uncertainty about how much return the innovation can 
bring even if the patent is granted (Pakes, 1986).  
Second, one important feature of an option is the asymmetric pay-off distribution 
to the investment: an option enables the holder to keep the upside potential but limit the 
downside risk to the fixed option price. This is also true for the distribution of potential 
returns to patents, which are asymmetric. Because holding a patent does not commit the 
firm to follow-on commercialization activities, a firm can limit the downside risk to the 
patent related fee and make decisions about commercialization later. Thus the firm 
acquires the right to obtain exclusive return that can be substantial but control the 
potential downside loss.  
Third, related to asymmetric distribution of returns, the flexibility in subsequent 
decision making makes patents an appropriate context to apply the real options 
perspective. Firms do not have to decide from the beginning exactly how they are going 
to commercialize the patent. Rather, they collect updated information and make a series 
of decisions about whether they should keep the patent, and how they should make 
sequential investments into the commercialization.  
Fourth, patents can be regarded as real options since patents can have significant 
upside potential that is not reflected in current earnings. A firm may be exercising some 
patent rights and produce earnings, but in addition to these earnings, it is likely that these 
patents may be used in other applications and lead to future growth. This upside growth 
potential can constitute a large portion of the value of the patented innovation, especially 
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when it is still in the early stage of technology development and there is still substantial 
uncertainty about the future use. Even a patent that currently does not yield cash inflow 
can still be highly valuable because it may be used in the future. Therefore, 
conceptualizing patents as real options can capture the embedded value in patents while 
traditional valuation approaches such as NPV tend to misjudge the real value of patents 
by ignoring the future growth opportunities. 
The literature on firm innovation has seen studies that operationalized real options 
using patents. Pakes (1986) is among the first studies that see patents as firms‘ 
investment in R&D activities. Nerkar and his colleagues have conducted a series of 
studies that examine firms‘ innovation strategies by treating patents as options. McGrath 
and Nerkar (2004) considered a firm‘s second patent granted in a technological area as an 
option for the firm to enter that area. Nerkar and MacMillan (2004) considered patents 
real options that give the flexibility of deferment and provide potential competitive 
advantage and superior rents. Nerkar, Paruchuri and Khaire (2007) proposed that patents 
are options that give the holders the potential right but not the obligation to sue others. Li 
and Hesterly (2006) also used patents as options for firms to make follow-on investments. 
Patent data offer a rare opportunity to examine firms‘ investment abandonment 
decisions. In many countries patents are protected for a specified period of time and it is 
required that patent holders renew their patents periodically after the grant until the 
statutory limit is reached (typically 15-20 years). At each renewal time, the firm will 
decide whether to renew their granted patents according to their judgment of the value of 
these patents. Either the assignee firm pays the maintenance fee and renews the patent, or 
it abandons the patent. The United State patent system, for example, usually protects 
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granted patents for 20 years. Since 1983, all US patents‘ assignees need to decide 
whether to renew the patent at the end of the 3.5
th
, 7.5
th
, 11.5
th
 years following the grant. 
After the initial granting of the patent by the United States Patent and Trade Office, a 
maintenance fee of $890 is required after 3.5 years, $2050 after 7.5 years, and $3150 
after 11.5 years (as shown in Figure 10)
1,2
. Other countries such as France, Germany and 
Britain have similar patent maintenance request (the European Patent Office requires 
annual patent renewal).  
                                                          abandon abandon abandon 
 
 renew($890) renew($2050) renew($3150) 
  
                           3.5yrs 4yrs 4yrs 8.5yrs 
 
Figure 10:  U.S. Patent renewal decision 
 
If the firm decides that the patented innovation is yielding considerable current 
earnings or may lead to considerable growth opportunities, it is willing to pay the 
maintenance fee and keep the patent in force.  If a firm, based on information at hand, 
decides that a patent has only quite limited value in terms of the sum of current earnings 
                                                 
1
 The owner of a US patent has an additional six month grace period to pay the fee. The patent rights expire 
after that unless reinstatement is granted. If a patent expires due to nonpayment of maintenance fee, the 
owner may petition the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office) for consideration to reinstate 
the patent. Reinstatement may be granted if the firm can show that the failure to pay on time is unavoidable. 
If reinstatement is granted, however, the patent owner needs to pay the maintenance fee plus an additional 
surcharge for reinstatement. Reinstatement may also be granted if the late payment of maintenance fee is 
unintentional, with a surcharge much higher than if it is unavoidable. 
 
2
 Effective December 8
th
 2004, the maintenance fee increases to $900 due at 3.5 years, $2300 due at 7.5 
years, and $3800 due at 11.5 years. 
Patent 
granted 
Patent 
expired 
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and potential future returns, it simply does not pay the maintenance fee and just lets the 
patent expire. In other words, it abandons the patent and forgoes the embedded growth 
options. Whether the firm chooses to renew or abandon the patent is thus based upon both 
the current earnings and the growth option value of the patent.  
If the firm renews a patent, the firm has the right to gain potential payoff from the 
patent during the next period of time but does not have further obligations. In addition, it 
gains the right to wait to decide whether to renew the patent later on. As information 
about the patent value is revealed over time, this waiting can have positive value. If a 
firm decides not to renew the patent, it abandons its exclusive right to the patented 
technology forever. As both the maintenance fee and the abandonment decision are 
irreversible, the firm needs to make the decision carefully. In this study, I do not try to 
explicitly calculate the option value. Rather, I study factors that impact the perceived 
value of the patents and examine how these factors are related to the patent abandonment 
decision.  
            Most patents are applied for in the early development phase. Because of the non-
trivial maintenance fee, and the management of patented innovation involving human 
labor and financial costs, a firm will only keep those patents it highly values. Although it 
may be argued that the amount of maintenance fee is not significant so that firms may 
renew all their patents, the actual costs of maintaining patents may be much more 
significant than the maintenance fee. Lowe and Veloso (2004) argued that there may be 
significant organizational costs of maintaining patents such as monitoring and litigating 
and internal management costs. They suggested that firms‘ patent abandonment decision 
is a planned and structured process that involves attorneys, scientists and business 
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development. Previous research also shows that firms consistently abandon some of their 
patents. Schankerman and his colleagues found that more than half of all patents are 
voluntarily abandoned by nonpayment within ten years of the date of patent application 
(Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Cornelli and Schankerman, 1999). Lanjouw (1998) made 
a similar observation. Pakes (1986) reported that fewer than 7% of patents are renewed 
for full term and that in Germany the proportion is around 11%. Econometric studies 
have confirmed that the patent renewal request influences the decision to patent and that 
firms held more valuable patents longer (Pakes, 1986; Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; 
Schanderman, 1998; Lanjouw, 1998). In this study I choose to examine the first renewal 
decision, where uncertainty about the total return is most significant. My focus is not the 
amount of renewal fees as hurdles but the conditions that lead to firms‘ abandonment 
decisions. 
  
IV. 1. 2 Extant literature on patent abandonment 
There are a limited number of preceding studies on patent abandonment and 
renewal in the literature. Most of them examine issues of policy effectiveness and are 
concerned with the improvement of social welfare. Cornelli and Schankerman (1999), for 
example, argued that differentiated patent lives can be better than a uniform patent life in 
terms of social welfare. They suggested that patent renewal fees can be an incentive 
device to implement a policy of optimally differentiated patent lives. Scotchmer (1999) 
also discussed optimal patent length, but concluded that the patent renewal system is not 
better than a uniform patent life. Some researchers use patent renewal data to 
operationalize patent value. Among them, Pakes and Schankerman (1984) were the first 
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to develop a deterministic model that uses patent renewal data to infer the value of patent 
protection. Since then other studies have also used patent renewal data to estimate the 
value of patent rights (Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Sullivan, 1994; Pakes, 1986; 
Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam, 1998; Schankerman, 1998). Pakes (1986), for example, 
suggested that because the value of patented innovations is very disperse and highly 
skewed, the use of a simple count of the number of patents either applied for or granted is 
a very noisy measure of innovation value. He argued that renewal data can be very 
helpful to measure the value of patents.  
While the extant literature on patent renewal focuses on policy issues and patent 
value estimates, which are measurable after the renewal decisions are made, there is a 
lack of research on the patent renewal decisions themselves: how do firms decide 
whether to renew or abandon their patents? Which factors influence their decisions? 
Recent studies in strategic management start to examine these research questions and 
provide insightful thoughts. Nerkar and MacMillan (2004) examined firms‘ patent 
abandonment decisions by incorporating learning of the focal firms. Li and Hesterly 
(2006) proposed that different rent-seeking goals of firms impact their patent 
abandonment decisions. They found that at the industry level, firms focusing on 
Ricardian rents should have a greater tendency to continue R&D projects and delay 
abandonment decisions than firms focusing on Schumpeterian rents. Lowe and Veloso 
(2004) found that search of new knowledge influences patent renewal. These studies, 
however, are mostly limited to certain individual patent features and have not examined 
the impact of firm specific characteristics. Therefore further research on patent 
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abandonment is still needed to advance the understanding of the actual managerial 
decisions. 
 
IV. 2. Data and Sample 
            I choose the U.S. patents of firms granted in year 1994 and year 1995 in the world 
chemical industry (4-digit SIC code 2800-2899) as the empirical setting of the study. The 
literature has often seen studies using real options theory to examine firms‘ R&D in the 
context of the chemical industry (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). By 
choosing firms in one industry instead of multiple industries that vary in many aspects 
including technology, I avoid the substantial inter-industry differences. Meanwhile, I 
choose a relatively broad conceptualization of the industry by working at the 2-digit SIC 
level. By doing so, I am still studying firms that are similar in technological knowledge 
and related in term of R&D activities, which will improve the generalizability of the 
findings.  
            I use U.S. patent data for all firms to maintain consistency, reliability, and 
comparability, as patenting systems differ across nations (Ahuja, 2000). Doing so can 
ensure that the patents studied face largely the same institutional environment. I include 
the foreign firms in the sample to improve the generalizability of the findings. Firms that 
are based in countries other than United States also patent their innovations they consider 
important in the U.S. 
I use the NBER patent database (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001) and the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) public online database to collect 
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patent data for all the firms.  I use ―utility patents‖ only.3 I use COMPUSTAT to collect 
data on firms‘ sales, cash, number of employees, and R&D expenditures. The unit of 
analysis in this dissertation is the individual patent renewal and the associated content of 
the patent, and the level of analysis is the firm. 
The patent‘s grant date is used rather than the application date, as I am examining 
how factors at the time of the renewal decision impact the likelihood of abandoning the 
patent, and the abandonment decision has to be made certain years after the grant date not 
the application date. Because I am interested in the cross-sectional variation in 
investment valuation in this study, I examine patents that are granted in two years and 
control for the year. The reason to include two years‘ versus one year‘s patents in the 
sample is to have a sample of adequate size. By examining the abandonment decision of 
these patents, I control the time to expiration date, which is one of the factors determining 
option value in the Black-Sholes model. I choose to examine patents granted in year 1994 
and year 1995 for the study. By choosing two years at least 13 years after the renewal 
system was installed, I avoid any problems that may have occurred in the initial set up of 
the system. Finally, the year 1995 is the most recent year that NBER has updated data 
that allows the empirical study to be conducted. The official published NBER patent data 
set include citation data made by patents granted in 1975-1999, which allows a four-year 
window of forward citation examination for patents granted up to the year of 1995. 
            I first identify firms in the 2-digit SIC code ―28‖ that are traded in North America 
in year 1994 and year 1995 using COMPUSTAT, as firm performance and other factors 
                                                 
3
 Utility patents are any new and useful method, process, machine, device, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. In my sample I exclude plant patents (with initial P), 
design patents (with initial D), reissued patents (with initial RE), reexaminations (with initial B) and other 
non-utility patent documents such as statutory invention registration (SIR, with initial H). For most firms, 
these non-utility patent documents account for a very small proportion of their total patent documents. 
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that are needed for the analysis require that data base. Then I used NBER database to 
check for patents from these firms that were granted in the year 1994 and 1995 and 
dropped firms that do not have successful patent applications in those two years. (This is 
because I am examining firms‘ patent abandonment decisions. Such firms do not need to 
choose between renewal and abandonment for any 1994 or 1995 patents four years later.)  
            The data include 7394 patents, of which 3805 patents are granted to 90 firms in 
year 1994 and 3589 patents granted to 90 firms in year 1995. After dropping observations 
with missing data (NBER data set does not have the variable of originality for some 
patents, and in COMPUSTAT the data of some firms‘ sales, R&D expenditure and/or 
cash are missing), the final data include 7000 patents, of which 3582 are granted in year 
1994 to 85 firms and 3418 are granted in year 1995 to 83 firms. The 7000 patents belong 
to 91 firms from 5 countries: DNK (Denmark), GBR (Great Britain & N. Ireland), IRL 
(Ireland), NLD (Netherlands) and USA
4
. 
 
IV. 3. Measures 
IV.3.1 Dependent variable 
Patent abandonment 
            The dependent variable is whether a patent granted in year 1994 or 1995 is 
abandoned or renewed at the end of the fourth year after the initial grant. A dummy 
variable (abandon) is used: 1 if the patent is abandoned, 0 if renewed. I collect patent 
renewal information from the electronic official Gazette published weekly on USPTO 
website. In the Gazette USPTO gives notices of expiration of patents due to failure to pay 
                                                 
4
 While the firms belong to 5 countries, the first inventors of these 7000 patents are more scattered, located 
in 25 countries. 
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maintenance fee and any applicable surcharge. In addition, I also check the Errata and 
Erratum in the Gazette notices to incorporate the possible corrections announced by 
USPTO on patent expiration. 
 
 
IV. 3.2 Independent variables  
Current earnings 
            I use the non-self citations received by a patent from the grant date onward to 4 
years later as a proxy for the current earnings on the patent (nonselfcite), taking into 
account the six month grace period. By non-self citations, I mean those received citations 
from U.S. patents that are granted to other assignees. Patents may receive citations from 
subsequent innovations patented by the same assignee (self-citations) and other unrelated 
assignees (non-self citations). While there is no accessible means of collecting 
information for a large sample study about the exact current earnings on a patent through 
litigation, licensing and internal leveraging, the forward non-self citations of the patent 
provide valuable information reflecting the current earnings of the patented innovation. 
Many patent studies have found that the number of forward citations a patent receives 
from subsequent patents is highly correlated with its technological impact as well as its 
social and economic value (e.g., Albert et al, 1991; Trajtenberg, 1990). For most patents, 
the bulk of their forward citations are received six years after grant (Jaffe et al, 1993). So 
when the first renewal decision has to be made, a firm still cannot precisely value the 
patent just by relying on the number of citations received (Nerkar and MacMillan, 2004). 
However, these citations reflect the likelihood that litigation may take place, the patent 
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may be licensed to other firms, and the holding firm may commercialize it into new 
products during the prior four years and into the future. Scholars have argued that self-
citations and non-self citations have different meanings as the self-citations are related to 
a firm‘s prior endeavors (Sorenson and Stuart, 2000; Bogner and Bansal, 2007).  Thus, 
the number of non-self citations received by the end of the four years can be used to 
proxy for of the patent‘s current earnings. 
 
Explorative degree 
            To measure the explorative degree of a patent (explore), I use the measurement 
formula that Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson (1997) developed to measure the 
originality of a patent.  
(2)     Explore= 1-nijS
2
ij 
where Sij is the percentage of citations made by patent i that belong to technology class j, 
out of the total number of technology classes ni that the patent cites. The more original a 
patent is, the more explorative it is.  
 
Sunk cost 
            While the measure of current earnings (nonselfcite) described above uses citations 
received from subsequent U.S. patents granted to the focal firms, I use self-citations 
(selfcite) to proxy for sunk cost that is already invested in the deployment of the focal 
patent. It is difficult to accurately measure the resources firms have invested in each of 
their innovations for a large sample study. Furthermore, such information may be 
unavailable to researchers for business confidential reasons. The self-citations of a patent 
offer an opportunity to approximate sunk cost that is associated with the patented 
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innovation, as self-citations manifest the financial resources and other resources such as 
managerial attention and R&D efforts the firm has devoted to the focal innovation, and 
such resources once invested typically cannot be reversed. In addition, self-citations also 
signal the technological trajectory underlying the deployment of the innovation. They are, 
hence, a type of sunk cost related to the deployment of the focal patent, although not the 
sunk cost used to create the focal patent. When the first patent renewal decision is made 
only 4 years after the grant, higher sunk cost may make a firm tend to renew the patent to 
gain more time for more favorable signals to be revealed. I calculate the number of a 
patent‘s forward U.S. patent citations that belong to the same firm from the grant date 
onward to 4 years later. 
 
 
Initial expectation 
            I proxy initial expectation of a patent‘s value with the number of claims a firm 
made according to the front page of the patent (claims). The inventor of a patented 
innovation makes claims on his or her innovation when applying for patent. These claims 
appear in their own section of the patent. Tong & Frame (1994) pointed out that during 
litigation proceedings, the claims made by the firm help to explain what is non-obvious 
and non-trivial. The number of claims of a patent reflects a firm‘s a priori perception of 
the usefulness and potential value of the patent. 
 
Scope of application 
            I use the number of classes that the patent is assigned (clsno) by the USPTO to 
measure the scope of application of a patent. The more classes into which a patent is 
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classified, the more likely the patent can be applied broadly. Some researchers suggested 
that three-digit-level patent classes are too broad and that patent subclasses should be 
used (Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005). However, other scholars have argued that class 
level classification is more reliable and can be used with greater confidence (Henderson, 
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 2005). I follow the latter researchers because the subclass 
classification utilized in U.S. patent system is not nested thus using the number of 
subclasses can lead to biased conclusion. I collect this variable directly from the public 
website of USPTO. 
 
Knowledge depth 
            I measure the knowledge depth of a firm in a technological area (depth) with 
backward citation data. This use of backward citations to measure firm knowledge is 
consistent with other studies that have used patent backward citations as a measure of 
knowledge held by a firm (e.g., Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). I define a technological area 
consistent with the U.S. patent classification, using patent class to represent a 
technological area. I look at all backward citations a firm‘s patents make, and calculate 
how many times the firm cites patents in a patent class. The more a firm cites from a 
patent class, the more it accumulates insight and knowledge in this technological area 
(Katila, 2002). Although there are studies using patent backward citations to measure a 
firm‘s knowledge, to my knowledge this measurement of a firm‘s knowledge depth using 
backward patent citation is new. I collect backward citation data for a five year period 
(1989-1993 for patents granted in 1994, and 1990-1994 for patents granted in 1995) to 
capture the bulk of the firm‘s knowledge accumulation. This five year window is used 
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rather than the entire patent stock of the firm because technological knowledge 
experiences loss with time. The use of a five year window is consistent with prior studies 
such as Fleming (2001) and Ahuja & Katila (2001). This measure is natural-log 
transformed to reduce the skewness of the data. 
 
Knowledge complementarity 
            The knowledge complementarity between a technological area and a firm‘s other 
technological areas (comple) is measured using the citations the patents in one class made 
to and received from the patents in the other classes in which the firm has patents granted. 
The past citations between technological areas imply the degree to which value can be 
created by combining the knowledge from those areas. Fleming and Sorenson (2001) 
suggested that some technological areas are more linked to each other than other areas 
and combining knowledge components from these areas are more likely to lead to 
valuable solutions. Based on that logic, I operationalize the measure of knowledge 
complementarity by using the entire U.S. patent history in the period year 1975 through 
1998, and using the following formula: 
                                                                                                                  j
 
                                                   comple =  (citeij+ citeji),                 (3) 
 
where i represents the primary class the focal patent is in, j is the number of the firm‘s 
other patent classes, citeij is the number of patents in class i that cite patents in class j, and  
citeji is the number of citations that patents in class i receive from patents in class j. The 
patent history before year 1975 is not used as NBER data does not include patent citation 
information prior that year. This, however, should not be a problem as 24 years‘ patent 
history should capture the bulk of interdependencies between technological areas, 
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especially when knowledge loss is considered. The information up to year 1998 is used 
because it is the complementarity information prior to patent renewal decision that may 
be used by firms to facilitate their abandonment versus renewal decisions. To reduce data 
skewness, the measure is also natural-log transformed. If a firm does not have patents 
granted in any other class, this measure is given the value of 0. This measurement of 
knowledge complementarity using patent backward citations is unique. Although the 
literature has addressed knowledge complementarity, especially the alliance literature, 
many studies have coarsely operationalized it. Some studies used qualitative 
questionnaires to quantify it, which may provide valuable insight as to managers‘ 
judgment. However, quantification of objective data is still needed to corroborate the 
observation from questionnaires completed by managers. Plus, it is not feasible to get 
managers‘ perception of knowledge complementarity for many refined technological 
classes through survey for a large sample empirical study. 
 
IV.3.3 Controls 
Firm size 
            Firm size is controlled using a firm‘s annual sales (sales) (in millions). I lag this 
variable by one year. The variable is natural-log transformed.  
 
Financial resources availability 
            I control the financial resources availability of a firm by measuring its free cash 
flow (cash). This variable is also lagged by one year and naturally logged. I expect a 
positive impact of this variable on patent renewal. The more financial resources are 
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available, the more likely a firm is to renew its patents, all other things equal. As 
expected, preliminary analysis finds that firms‘ sales is highly correlated with firms‘ cash. 
The correlation between these two variables in the sample is as high as 0.8019 and is 
highly significant. Including both variables in a regression model could lead to a 
multicollinearity problem. To tackle this issue, I regress the cash measure on sales and 
obtain a new variable orthcash, which equals to the residual of the regression. This new 
variable is orthogonal to sales and used as the cash measure in the regression models. 
 
Firm nationality 
            There are country differences that may affect a firm‘s patent abandon decisions. I 
use a dummy variable to indicate whether a firm is from US or other countries (d_us). A 
patent in the U.S. may be more important for a U.S. firm than a foreign based firm. 
 
Pharmaceutical firm or not 
            Pharmaceutical firms may be biased toward keeping more of their patents granted 
than other types of firm do due to the extremely heavy investment in R&D and the long 
time required for R&D activities in this industry. I use a dummy variable (d_drug) to 
control whether the firm is in the four-digit SIC 2834 pharmaceutical industry, 1 if yes, 0 
otherwise.  
 
Innovation orientation 
            I measure a firm‘s innovation orientation using its R&D intensity (rnd_int), 
calculated as the firm‘s R&D spending over the firm‘s sales. I expect that the more a firm 
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is innovation oriented, the more it builds competitive advantage on innovativeness, so it 
may be more likely to keep its patents in force. 
 
Diversification 
            I control for firm diversification using the number of 4-digit SIC segments it 
reports sales in COMPUSTAT (seg_no). I expect that diversification positively impacts a 
firm‘s likelihood to renew its patents as it may possibly apply the innovations in multiple 
businesses. 
 
Year dummy 
          As the sample include patents granted in year 1994 and 1995, I control for the grant 
year by having a year dummy (d_1995). By doing so, I eliminate the possible 
heterogeneity due to any undetected systematic differences between patents granted in 
the two years. 
  
IV. 4. Model specification 
            Logistic analysis is used to examine how the independent variables and the 
control variables impact the likelihood a patent will be abandoned. The model is specified 
as follows (showing dependent variable and independent variables only): 
 
Logit(abandon)=β1*nonselfcite + β2*selfcite  + β3*claims + β4* explore + β5 *clsno+  
β6*depth + β7* comple + σ                                                                                                 (4) 
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             As the 7000 patents in the sample belong to 90 firms, regressions of patents 
renewal without controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity will produce biased 
findings. One possible consequence is that the regressions may artificially increase the 
statistical significance level of the estimates of coefficient. To deal with this concern, I 
cluster by firm when I run the logistic regressions.  Doing so allows me to isolate the 
patent abandonment likelihood from unobserved firm effects that could bias the 
estimation. 
             
CHAPTER FIVE  
RESULTS 
 
Unless otherwise noted, all the patent related information is from the NBER 
database. I use multiple data files in the NBER data set: PAT63_99, which is the main 
NBER data set that includes all the utility patents granted from year 1963 through year 
1999; CITE75_99, the citations file, which includes all citations made by patents granted 
in 1975-1999; and the Compustat file, which contains the patent assignee information and 
thus allows one to match and link out patents with firm data available in the Compustat 
data base. I use SAS to merge these data and calculate all the independent variables 
except for clsno, which is collected from the USPTO website. Then I merge these 
variables with firm level data from Compustat and derive the control variables. After the 
data merging with SAS code of more than twenty pages, I run the data analysis using 
logistic regressions with STATA logit routine.  
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V. 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables and Table 4 gives the 
correlation matrix. While the regressions only use orthcash but not cash, I include sale in 
the descriptive statistics table in order to illustrate the original firm slack resource 
information. 
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1. abandon 7000 0.1267143 0.3326764 0 1
2. nonselfcite 7000 1.751143 3.159622 0 50
3. selfcite 7000 0.9338571 3.100276 0 50
4. claims 7000 13.44657 10.23448 1 134
5. explore 7000 0.4504804 0.2735831 0 0.9091
6. clsno 7000 1.961429 1.080922 1 8
7. depth 7000 4.082262 2.081432 0 7.364547
8. comple 7000 7.302482 2.443513 0.6931472 12.10537
9. sale 7000 8.670805 1.446928 0.0723207 10.43817
10. cash 7000 5.54363 1.519965 0.1475576 7.792349
11. orthcash 7000 -4.94E-09 0.9079949 -3.417985 2.953134
12. rnd_int 7000 0.0177293 0.0258944 0.0006946 0.5356074
13. seg_no 7000 2.824143 1.626001 1 6
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Table 4
Correlations
Variable abandon nonselfcite selfcite claims explore clsno depth comple sale orthcash rnd_int seg_no
abandon 1
nonselfcite -0.0541 ** 1
selfcite -0.0444 ** 0.1404 ** 1
claims -0.0547 ** 0.1329 ** 0.1006 ** 1
explore -0.0346 ** 0.0271 ** 0.023 * 0.061 ** 1
clsno 0.0358 ** 0.0075 0.0377 ** 0.0533 ** 0.1958 ** 1
depth 0.0288 ** 0.056 ** 0.0893 ** 0.0087 -0.1413 ** -0.0667 ** 1
comple -0.0406 ** 0.044 ** 0.0505 ** 0.0039 -0.0766 ** -0.0049 0.5755 ** 1
sale 0.038 ** 0.0113 -0.0182 -0.0611 ** -0.0146 -0.0542 ** 0.3429 ** 0.1971 ** 1
orthcash -0.0305 ** 0.0381 ** 0.104 ** -0.0021 -0.0659 ** 0.0399 ** 0.1445 ** 0.0615 ** 0 1
rnd_int -0.0093 0.0025 0.0013 -0.0069 -0.0652 ** 0.0742 ** -0.0489 ** -0.0377 ** -0.3093 ** 0.2204 ** 1
seg_no -0.0132 -0.0084 -0.0335 ** -0.0041 0.0348 ** -0.0637 ** 0.1816 ** 0.0561 ** 0.6431 ** -0.0883 ** -0.2239 ** 1
n = 7000 patents
** p<.05
* p<.1
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            Table 4 provides the correlation matrix for all the variables. It shows that the 
highest correlation between any two of the independent variables is r= 0.5755 between 
knowledge depth (depth) and complementarity (comple), and the highest correlation 
between any variables is r= 0.6431 between two control variables of firm size (sale) and 
diversification (seg_no). All the other correlations are below 0.35. This level of 
correlation indicates that problems of multicollinearity are unlikely to be manifested in 
the data. Moreover, the table also shows a low level of correlation between the measures 
of patent level characteristics: current earnings (nonselfcite), sunk cost (selfcite), initial 
expectation (claims), and scope of application (clsno). This low correlation also suggests 
that these measures capture distinctive dimensions of the value of a patent. To further 
check whether there is multicollinearity issue with the variables, I calculate the VIF 
(Variance Inflation Factor) of independent variables and control variables.  Table 5 
reports the VIF of these variables. The result shows that the data conform to the non-
multicollinearity assumption: the highest VIF is 2.01 and the mean VIF for all the 
variables is only 1.32, both much lower than the generally accepted cut off value of 10 
(Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, 2004). 
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Table 5
Variance Inflation Factors
Variable VIF 1/VIF
sale 2.01 0.496677
seg_no 1.75 0.570194
depth 1.7 0.586546
comple 1.51 0.662691
rnd_int 1.18 0.846977
orthcash 1.1 0.905669
original 1.08 0.929488
clsno 1.06 0.944926
selfcite 1.05 0.954439
nonselfcite 1.04 0.96247
claims 1.04 0.963427
Mean VIF 1.32
 
 
V. 2. Hypotheses Testing 
            Table 6 presents results of the logistic regression models of abandonment 
likelihood. I provide seven models. All seven models are significant. All the models with 
independent variable(s) have chi square above 24, and are highly significant (p< 0.0018 
for Model 2, p < 0.0000 for all the other Models with independent variable(s)). Model 1 
in Table 6 is the base model that comprises only the control variables. Model 2 adds the 
variable for Hypothesis 1, current earnings. Model 3 contains the predictor variables for 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, sunk cost and initial expectation. Model 4 includes the predictor 
variables of uncertainty, scope of application, knowledge depth and knowledge 
complementarity. Model 5 and 6 are the nested models of Model 2 & 3, and Model 2 & 4 
 81 
respectively. Model 7 is the full model that includes all the independent variables and 
control variables to test the impact on patent abandonment likelihood. 
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Table 6 
Logistic Regression Models of Abandonment Likelihood
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Nonself citations -0.0748 *** -0.0604 ** -0.0729 *** -0.0587 **
0.0269 0.0257 0.0265 0.0253
Self citations -0.0821 -0.0703 -0.0727 *
0.0521 0.0489 0.0435
Number of claims -0.0161 *** -0.0140 ** -0.0149 ***
0.0062 0.0058 0.0057
Explorativeness -0.4585 ** -0.4226 ** -0.3900 *
0.2239 0.2150 0.2119
Number of patent classes 0.1360 *** 0.1351 *** 0.1431 ***
0.0479 0.0478 0.0481
Knowledge depth 0.1237 **** 0.1280 **** 0.1394 ****
0.0383 0.0380 0.0383
Knowledge complementarity -0.1276 **** -0.1253 **** -0.1243 ****
0.0301 0.0301 0.0299
Firm size (sale) 0.2345 0.2447 0.2285 0.2272 0.2363 0.2332 0.2176
0.1574 0.1574 0.1561 0.1439 0.1566 0.1438 0.1430
Cash -0.1166 -0.1114 -0.0974 -0.1344 -0.0966 -0.1303 -0.1181
0.1342 0.1348 0.1363 0.1250 0.1364 0.1253 0.1268
R&D intensity 1.4928 1.4153 1.1792 0.8747 1.1506 0.7746 0.4659
2.5875 2.5602 2.5592 2.6811 2.5463 2.6553 2.6354
Diversification -0.1711 -0.1797 -0.1726 -0.1845 -0.1789 -0.1921 -0.1905
0.1401 0.1370 0.1368 0.1337 0.1350 0.1309 0.1296
US firms -0.7191 ** -0.7186 ** -0.6867 ** -0.6850 ** -0.6912 ** -0.6968 *** -0.6805 ***
0.2903 0.2820 0.2789 0.2715 0.2728 0.2618 0.2540
Drug firms -0.2186 -0.2268 -0.2386 -0.2633 -0.2379 -0.2707 -0.2789
0.3535 0.3424 0.3581 0.3368 0.3485 0.3261 0.3312
Year 1995 0.0518 -0.0004 0.0413 0.0562 0.0015 0.0047 0.0058
0.1072 0.1080 0.1057 0.1048 0.1070 0.1057 0.1054
Constant -2.7907 ** -2.7121 ** -2.4841 ** -2.3678 ** -2.4525 ** -2.2947 ** -2.0352 *
1.1747 1.1630 1.1607 1.0771 1.1542 1.0651 1.0493
Chi square 15.04 ** 24.56 *** 71.99 **** 47.04 **** 75.01 **** 50.41 128.69 ****
Log likelihood -2632.98 -2619.88 -2614.93 -2598.81 -2606.77 -2586.49 -2572.18
13.1 18.05 34.17 26.21 46.49 60.8
Note: The table gives parameter estimates; the robust standard error is below each parameter estimate.
**** p < 0.001
*** p < 0.01
** p < 0.05
* p < 0.10
Log likelyhood improvement  vs. the
base model
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            Model 1 tests the effects of control variables on the likelihood to abandon a patent. 
Only the country dummy variable is significant, having a negative effect on abandonment 
likelihood, suggesting that patents belonging to U.S. firms are much more likely to be 
renewed. This finding is consistent with prior studies (Lowe & Veloso, 2004) and makes 
intuitive sense as technological innovations patented in U.S. are more important for U.S. 
firms than for foreign based firms. All the other control variables do not have significant 
impact on patent abandonment (after clustering by firms). These effects of control 
variables largely remain in the subsequent models. 
            Hypothesis1 predicts a negative relationship between current earnings and the 
abandonment likelihood. In Model 2, the coefficient for the non-self citations is negative 
and significant, supporting the hypothesis. This estimation is consistent in Model 5 
through 7 (in the full Model, βnonselfcite= -0.0587, p< 0.05), offering strong support for 
Hypothesis 1. This finding is consistent with findings from prior research (Nerkar & 
MacMillan, 2004).  
            Hypothesis 2 predicts that sunk cost reduces abandonment likelihood.  The 
coefficient for the self-citations in Model 3 and Model 5 are negative but not significant. 
In the full model, the coefficient for self-citations is negative and significant at p< 0.1 (p< 
0.95, very close to the non-significant level). Thus hypothesis 2 only receives partial 
support. This finding is slightly different from prior research. Nerkar & MacMillan 
(2004), for example, found a strong negative relationship between self-citations and 
patent abandonment (p< 0.01 in all their models). Li & Hesterly (2004) also found that 
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firms tend to keep patents with high percentage of self-citations for a longer period of 
time than those patents with low percentage of self-citations. 
            Hypothesis 3 predicts that initial expectation will negatively impact the patent 
abandonment likelihood. The parameter coefficient for claims is significantly negative in 
Model 3 at p< 0.01 and Model 5 at p< 0.05, and also the full model at p< 0.001. This 
result offers strong support for Hypothesis 3. This finding is consistent with Li & 
Hesterly (2004), who found that the number of claims of a patent delay the abandonment 
timing. 
            Hypothesis 4 regards the impact of innovation explorativeness on patent 
abandonment. While the behavioral theory of firm predicts a positive impact on patent 
abandonment likelihood (Hypothesis 4a), real options theory predicts the opposite 
relationship (Hypothesis 4b). In all the Models that contain this variable, i.e., Model 4, 
Model 6 and Model 7, the parameter coefficient for explorativeness is negatively 
significant. In the full model, βexplore = -0.39, at p< 0.1. These results offer strong support 
for the hypothesis from the real options perspective (H 4b) but not for the hypothesis 
based on the behavioral theory of the firm (H 4a). 
            Hypothesis 5a proposes that the scope of application for a patent reduces the 
abandonment likelihood thus a negative coefficient for the number of classes is expected, 
and Hypothesis 5b predicts the relationship to be of an opposite sign. Contrary to 
Hypothesis 5a expectation, the parameter coefficient for this variable is significant but 
has the opposite sign: it is positive at a highly significant level in all the models that 
include this variable. In the full model, for example, βclsno= 0.1431 at p< 0.01. Thus 
Hypothesis 5b receives support but not Hypothesis 5a. This finding is also only partially 
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consistent with prior studies. Nerkar & MacMillan (2004), for example, found that the 
scope of a patent is not significantly associated with patent abandonment likelihood. 
            Hypothesis 6 predicts that a firm‘s knowledge depth in a technological area 
decreases the likelihood that patents in that area will be abandoned. Thus a negative 
coefficient for knowledge depth is expected. Contrary to this expectation, knowledge 
depth is significant but has the opposite sign: the parameter coefficient for knowledge 
depth in all the models that contain this variable (Model 4, Model 6, and Model 7) is 
positive at a highly significant level, i.e., p< 0.001. In the full model, βdepth= 0.1394. This 
result suggests that, the more a firm develops knowledge in a technological area, the 
more likely the firm tend to abandon rather than renew its patents in that area. 
            Hypothesis 7 proposes that the higher the knowledge complementarity between a 
technological area and a firm‘s other technological areas, the less likely the innovations 
in that technological area will be abandoned. Consistent with this expectation, the 
coefficient for knowledge complementarity in all the models that include this predictor 
variable (Model 4, Model 6, and Model 7) is negative and highly significant. In Model 7, 
βcomple = 0.1243 at p< 0.001. The result provides strong support for this hypothesis. 
            I use the Wald test, which approximates the likelihood ratio test, to examine the 
improvement in explanatory power for nested models. Model 2 is enhanced over Model 1, 
(likelihood improvement = 13.10, chi square= 7.70, p< 0.01), suggesting that including 
the number of non-self citations as a predictor variable significantly improves the 
explanatory power with the control variables only. Similarly, Model 3 and Model 4 also 
have obtained enhanced explanatory power over the base model (Model 1) by including 
the predictor variables based on the behavioral theory and real options theory (likelihood 
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improvement = 18.05, chi square= 19.03, p< 0.0001; likelihood improvement = 34.17, 
chi square= 32.81, p< 0.0000). Hypotheses 8 and 9 regard the model fit and improvement 
when the behavioral theory of the firm and the real options perspective are considered. 
Hypothesis 8 proposes that adding the effect of sunk cost and initial expectation, we can 
better predict the likelihood that an innovation will be abandoned. Hypothesis 9 suggests 
that the incorporation of the explorativeness, scope of application, knowledge depth and 
knowledge complementarity can further improve the model fit for innovation 
abandonment likelihood. Model 5 is nested within Model 1 and tests Hypothesis 8. The 
Wald test result shows that this model has significantly enhanced explanatory power over 
Model 2 by introducing the variables from the behavioral theory (self-citations and 
number of claims) (likelihood improvement = 13.11, chi square= 16.79, p< 0.001). This 
result thus provides support for Hypothesis 8. Model 7 is nested within Model 5 and tests 
Hypothesis 9. The Wald test result shows that this full model has obtained explanatory 
power over Model 5 by further introducing the variables from real options theory 
(explorativenss, number of classes, knowledge depth and complementarity) (likelihood 
improvement = 34.59, chi square= 34.47, p< 0.001). This result offers support for 
Hypothesis 9. 
            I also examine a model with predictor variables based on NPV and real options 
theory, Model 6, which is nested with Model 2. Compared to Model 2, this model is of 
better fit (likelihood improvement = 33.39, chi square= 2.26, p< 0.000), suggesting that 
considering the effect of variables based on real options theory enhances the explanatory 
power on abandonment likelihood than the model with NPV variable only. 
 87 
            Comparing all the models conducted, Model 7 (the full model) has the greatest 
likelihood improvement and explanatory power as shown by the Wald test. Therefore, it 
is the best-fit model.  
            Table 7 presents the results for Model 7 with odds ratios reported.  
Table 7  
(Model 7  Odds Ratios Reported)
Odds Ratio Robust Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
nonselfcite 0.9429847 ** 0.0238907 0.8973033 0.9909916
selfcite 0.9298793 * 0.0404372 0.8539075 1.01261
claims 0.9851839 *** 0.0056297 0.9742114 0.9962798
explore 0.6770455 * 0.1434513 0.446958 1.025579
clsno 1.153852 *** 0.0554638 1.050109 1.267844
depth 1.149625 **** 0.043978 1.066582 1.239134
comple 0.8831327 **** 0.0263631 0.8329445 0.936345
sale 1.243063 0.1778046 0.93916 1.645307
orthcash 0.8885819 0.1126731 0.6930495 1.139281
rnd_int 1.593467 4.19945 0.0091007 279.006
seg_no 0.8265812 0.1071394 0.6411429 1.065654
d_us 0.5063418 ** 0.128592 0.3078012 0.8329469
d_drug 0.7565967 0.2505842 0.3953186 1.448044
d_1995 1.005787 0.1059977 0.8180878 1.236552
Note: 
****p< .0001
***p< .001
**p< .05
*p< .10
Results for Logistic Regression on Abandonment Likelihood
 
            To acquire more intuitive explanations of the implications of the parameter 
coefficient estimation, I also calculated the marginal effects on the probabilities of the 
independent variables of the full model. By using the Stata command of mfx, those 
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marginal effects in the probabilities are calculated when the dependent variable is at its 
mean value. Table 8 reports the marginal effects on the patent abandonment probabilities 
of the predictor variables. 
Table 8  
Marginal Effects on Abandonment Likelihood
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>|z| [    95% C.I.   ]
nonselfcite -0.0060152 0.0027 -2.22 0.026 -0.011314 -0.000716
selfcite -0.0074492 0.00437 -1.71 0.088 -0.016008 0.00111
claims -0.0015295 0.00063 -2.45 0.014 -0.002755 -0.000304
explore -0.0399628 0.022 -1.82 0.069 -0.083089 0.003163
clsno 0.0146632 0.00444 3.3 0.001 0.005967 0.02336
depth 0.0142872 0.00431 3.32 0.001 0.005841 0.022733
comple -0.0127342 0.00267 -4.77 0.000 -0.017963 -0.007506
sale 0.022294 0.01543 1.45 0.148 -0.007945 0.052533
orthcash -0.0121039 0.01271 -0.95 0.341 -0.037011 0.012803
rnd_int 0.0477394 0.27013 0.18 0.86 -0.481703 0.577182
seg_no -0.019515 0.01392 -1.4 0.161 -0.046794 0.007764
d_us* -0.0888401 0.03766 -2.36 0.018 -0.162657 -0.015023
d_drug* -0.0274631 0.03165 -0.87 0.386 -0.089496 0.03457
d_1995* 0.0005913 0.01079 0.05 0.956 -0.02055 0.021733
Note:
1. Marginal effects after logit
      y  = Pr(abandon) (predict)
         =  .11589616
2. (*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
 
            This table suggests that when the dependent variable (abandonment likelihood) is 
at its mean value, an additional non-self citation reduces the likelihood to abandon the 
patent by 0.60% (i.e., it is 0.60% more likely to be renewed); an additional self-citation 
reduces the abandonment likelihood by 0.74%; an additional claim decreases the 
abandonment likelihood by 0.15%; an additional unit of originality reduces the likelihood 
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that the patent will be abandoned by 0.39%; an additional number of class the patent is 
classified into boosts the abandonment likelihood by 1.47%; an additional unit of 
knowledge depth increases the abandonment likelihood by 1.43%; and an additional unit 
of knowledge complementarity increases the renewal likelihood by 1.27%. If a patent 
belongs to a U.S. firm, it is 8.88% more likely to be renewed than if it belongs to a 
foreign based firm. 
Table 9 provides a summary of the hypotheses testing results. 
Table 9 
Summary of Hypotheses Test Result 
Independent variable 
Predicted 
impact on 
abandonment 
likelihood Theory Findings 
current earnings - 
Economic, Real 
option support 
sunk cost - Behavioral partial support 
initial expectation - Behavioral support 
explorativeness 
+ Behavioral no support 
- Real option support 
scope of application 
- Real option no support 
 + Behavioral support 
knowledge depth - Real option opposite sign (+) 
knowledge 
complementarity - Real option support 
        
model fit improved by incorporating behavioral theory support 
model fit further improved by incorporating real otpions theory support 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION 
 
The principal purposes of this research are to explore whether firms make 
abandonment decisions in accordance with real options theory, and the relative strength 
of the traditional economic theory, the behavioral theory of the firm and real options 
theory in explaining firms‘ abandonment decisions. I developed and tested a set of 
hypotheses in the context of firms‘ decision making concerning innovation abandonment. 
The results from the empirical analyses provide evidence that taking a real options 
perspective improves the explanatory power of firms‘ investment abandonment decisions 
and thus increases our ability to understand as well as predict such managerial decisions. 
My study suggests that, 1) firms‘ actual innovation abandonment decisions are consistent 
with the predictions made from real options theory; and 2) a real options perspective 
provides better explanation of firms‘ abandonment decisions than traditional economic 
theory and the behavioral theory of the firm. 
Research has shown that competitive success often requires firms to make 
abandonment decisions in a timely manner. However, traditional approaches to decision 
making are not adequate to help firms make abandonment decisions: conventional NPV 
models tend to undervalue investments and thus lead to premature terminations of 
projects that have positive potential; in addition, behavioral biases introduce noise into 
the firms‘ investment valuation process and thus their abandonment decisions. As a result, 
organizations sometimes make abandonment decisions that appear inappropriate. Many 
studies in the past few decades have looked for evidence and the cause of inappropriate 
abandonment decisions. However, relatively few studies have examined how firms can 
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eliminate the biases in making their abandonment decisions and improve such decisions. 
The traditional economic theory is normative, but unrealistic to use given the many 
complications and limitations in actual managerial decision making. The behavioral 
theory is descriptive in describing what is actually occurring, but does not provide insight 
into what should be done. In this dissertation I suggest that real options theory may be 
used to enhance our understanding of firms‘ actual abandonment decisions. While my 
findings show that real options theory offers better explanatory power of firms‘ actual 
abandonment decisions, they lead us to the next critical step for future research: what is 
the prescriptive potential of this theory in enhancing managerial decision making?  
 
VI. 1. Three theories as reflected in the data 
The empirical results show that all three theories, traditional economic theory, the 
behavioral theory of the firm and real options theory are reflected in the data. Hypothesis 
1, which is based on traditional economic logic and consistent with real options theory, 
receives support, suggesting that firms do consider the current earnings from assets in 
place. But this predictor variable does not dominate the decision making of abandonment. 
Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5b also receive support, suggesting that the behavioral theory of the 
firm perspective is reflected in the data and we can conclude that managers exhibit 
behavioral biases in abandonment decisions. More specifically, the logistic regression 
results suggest that, all things being equal, higher initial expectations and sunk costs both 
make a firm tend to continue the investment. Regarding the impact of uncertainty, 
Hypothesis 4b based on real options theory receives strong support, but not Hypothesis 
4a, which is based on behavioral theory. This suggests that firms do not exhibit the 
 92 
uncertainty avoidance bias as predicted by the behavioral theory of the firm in their 
abandonment decisions, at least in the context of patented innovation renewal. Firms 
value the explorativeness thus the uncertainty of innovations rather than simply trying to 
circumvent it by giving little chance to innovations that carry high levels of uncertainty. 
We can conclude that adopting a real options perspective may help firms eliminate this 
uncertainty avoidance bias. Hypotheses 4b through 7 except 5b are based on real options 
theory. The results show evidence that a real options perspective is reflected in 
managerial decision making for abandonment decisions: in addition to the current 
earnings of the investment, firms also consider the growth option value embedded in the 
investment. More specifically, results suggest that the explorativeness and technological 
scope of innovations, and the firm‘s knowledge portfolio are associated with the firm‘s 
innovation abandonment decisions. 
As traditional NPV models cannot capture the value of embedded future growth 
opportunities, the NPV models are conservative in the valuation of investments, 
especially those with high levels of uncertainty. Firms that rely on such models to 
evaluate their investments and make investment decisions accordingly inevitably fall into 
the trap of underestimating their strategic investments. As a result, such firms do not 
invest enough in growth opportunities that are explorative thus uncertain but with high 
potential in the future as they should (Kougut and Kulatilaka, 1994). The real options 
reasoning, however, can recapture some value lost through the NPV valuation by adding 
in the value of growth options. The NPV valuation captures a base estimate of value of 
assets that are currently in place, and the option valuation adds in the value of the right to 
decide whether to pursue investment opportunities in the future. Therefore, taking a real 
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options perspective may help firms to be more willing to invest in explorative activities. 
The empirical data indicate that in the actual decision making of firms, managers 
consider factors beyond the NPV valuation models. This suggests that real options theory 
can help explain why firms sometimes pursue exploration activities, which cannot be 
fully explained with the NPV models. 
The results suggest that firms exhibit behavioral biases due to insufficient 
adjusting and sunk cost. The data show that firms are not prone to abandoning 
innovations that carry high levels of uncertainty, in accord with the real options 
perspective.  In the full model, the biases due to initial expectation and sunk cost are still 
present. However, the impact of sunk cost is at a relatively low level of significance and 
is significant in only one model, although very close to the 0.1 significance level in the 
other models. This suggests that firms exhibit only some of the behavioral biases in 
abandonment decisions.  
An important result of the study lies in testing the relative strength of each model 
in predicting decision outcomes.  It is important to note that this study does not propose 
real options theory as a replacement of either traditional investment valuation models 
such as NPV or behavioral theories as explanations for abandonment decisions. Rather, a 
real options approach provides a complementary perspective, taking into consideration of 
uncertainty, information asymmetry and path dependency. The comparison between the 
model based on NPV only and the model based on both NPV and the behavioral theory 
of the firm supports Hypothesis 8, showing that these two theoretical perspectives are not 
mutually exclusive to each other. The enhanced model fit suggests that the incorporation 
of the behavioral theory improves the explanatory power of firms‘ abandonment 
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decisions over the conventional NPV model. Hypothesis 9, which further compares the 
model based on NPV and behavioral theory and the model that incorporates all three 
theoretical perspectives, is also confirmed, suggesting that taking a real options 
perspective further improves the explanatory power. In addition, further comparison of 
the model that only contains predictor variables based on real options theory and models 
that also incorporate current earnings from NPV and the full model shows that the full 
model provides the ―best-fit‖ model.  
What is particularly interesting is that managers seem to behave according to all 
three theories. The results suggest that when making abandonment decisions, firms 
consider the current earnings as suggested by NPV models, exhibit some behavioral 
biases, and also utilize real option reasoning. Taking a real options perspective does not 
eliminate or lessen the significance of the other two theories (with the exception that 
firms value innovation explorativenss in accord with real options theory instead of 
circumventing explorativeness as predicted from behavioral theory). This shows that real 
options theory is not exclusive to the traditional economic logic or behavioral theory. 
Rather, the finding that the full model offers the best fit suggests that real options theory 
can act as a framework that ties together the other two theories. By taking the real options 
perspective and incorporating the other theories, we can have a better model to predict 
firms‘ strategic abandonment decisions.  
            The findings of this dissertation also confirm an argument that has recently 
captured academic attention in real option studies: firms manage a portfolio of real 
options, which may interact with each other and thus should not be evaluated in isolation 
(Vassolo et al, 2004; Anand et. al, 2006). In these studies, Vassolo, Anand and their co-
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authors show that under different conditions multiple options can be sub-additive or 
super-additive. In this research, I also find that a firm‘s knowledge depth and knowledge 
complementarity significantly impact its patent abandonment decisions. This finding 
provides support that a firm‘s options are not independent from each other; therefore the 
valuation of its investments should consider the path dependent accumulation of 
resources and capabilities. Otherwise, investment decisions made based on isolated 
valuation will lead to overinvestment or underinvestment by ignoring the interrelations 
among investments. 
It is important to note that in the context of strategic management, real options 
theory should be viewed as a decision tool rather than a valuation tool that is used to 
precisely estimate the value of investments. Unlike the well-defined financial options, the 
option pricing models such as the Black-Scholes Model cannot readily be used on 
complex business projects. It is impossible to get the exact risk and opportunities profile 
for strategic options on real assets. It can be extremely hard to find appropriate values for 
the input variables. MacMillan (2006) pointed out that for sequential investments such as 
firms‘ R&D, the value of a sequence of options is not strictly additive. In addition, the 
financial option pricing models do not differentiate the uncertainty source. For example, 
financial option pricing models including the Black-Scholes Model suggest that higher 
uncertainty means higher option value. For real options, however, the uncertainty from 
the side of costs will penalize rather than add to the growth option value (MacMillan et al, 
2006). Therefore, when managers adopt a real options perspective and use real options 
reasoning to facilitate managerial decision making, they cannot use option pricing models 
mindlessly. 
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Fortunately, though it is impossible to apply straightforward option pricing 
models to calculate the exact value of a strategic investment, firms often do not need to 
have a precise valuation for a specific project. As Putten & MacMillan (2004) pointed out, 
―Simple and quick is what‘s needed for most valuations…‖. Often the relative valuation 
of the firm‘s investments is what managers need to know. Porter (1996) has noted that 
―Strategy is making trade-offs in competing.‖ By comparing the valuation of multiple 
investment projects that compete for the firm‘s limited resources, managers are able to 
decide whether a given investment opportunity is preferable to other investment 
opportunities. Then they make investment decisions and allocate resources accordingly. 
As strategy is about resource allocation under conditions in which the resulting 
performance is not clear, real options theory can provide a very insightful perspective. 
 
VI. 2. Two significant results opposite to real option prediction 
Two significant opposite results deserve further discussion. First is the lack of 
support for the proposed negative impact of patent application scope on abandonment 
likelihood as in Hypothesis 5a. Contrary to the real option expectation but consistent with 
the behavioral theory argument, the scope of application of a patent significantly 
increases the likelihood that the patent will be abandoned. This result also contradicts 
with the findings of many extant studies that argue that patent scope or breadth is 
positively associated with the valuation of the patent or the innovator‘s profit function. 
Lerner (1994) for example, found that the breadth of patent protection significantly 
positively affects firm valuation. McGrath & Nerkar (2001) found that firms are more 
likely to further invest in new R&D activities in technological areas in which their first 
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patents are wider in scope. Shane (2001) also found that patented innovations of wider 
scope are more likely to be commercialized through new firm formation. All these studies 
utilize the number of patent classes to operationalize the patent scope.  
This finding suggests that managers may be biased in the evaluation of innovation 
scope. Two potential explanations exist for this finding in addition to the difficulties that 
managers may have in their valuation of innovation scope as discussed in the hypotheses 
development. First, it may be that when making innovation abandonment decisions, 
managers do not consider the positive potential because of the application scope of 
patents. This leads us to question the optimality of managers‘ decisions: are they making 
decisions that lead to the best result? While the real options reasoning helps us better 
predict managerial decisions in other aspects examined in this study, should it be 
prescriptive regarding patent scope in abandonment decision making? Given that prior 
research has found that scope is valuable for innovations, it is likely that using a real 
options reasoning here may result in better performance. Future research is needed to 
examine whether applying real options reasoning in this respect, i.e., retaining patents of 
wide application scope for a longer period, will lead to results better off for firms.  
Second, it is possible that technology may be different from other types of assets 
in that the generalizability of a technology does not always add to its value potential. 
Instead, there may be a trade-off between the generalizability and the specialization of a 
technology such that a more generalizable technology has lower potential than a 
specialized technology. Thus, unlike physical assets, generalizable technology on average 
may be less valuable than specialized technologies. As Table 4 shows, the class number 
of a patent is not significantly correlated with the non-self citations received and the 
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coefficient is small, suggesting that other firms may not value the patent scope on 
average. The table also shows a positive correlation between patent scope and self-
citations, suggesting that the assignee firm may perceive higher potential of the patent 
and commit more resources to capture the potential. However, it is questionable that any 
significant growth opportunities are actually embedded and the firm may really reap the 
growth option value. Still, this finding suggests that further exploration with the refined 
implications of innovation scope will be necessary and fruitful. For example, future 
research may use the international patent classification instead of the U.S. classification 
to measure patent scope and compare the findings. 
The second significant opposite result is the lack of support for proposed negative 
relationship between a firm‘s knowledge depth in a technological area and the likelihood 
the firm will abandon innovations in that area. Contrary to Hypothesis 6, I find a 
significant positive association between knowledge depth and abandonment likelihood. 
This suggests that firms do consider the degree to which they have accumulated 
knowledge in the technological area. While deeper knowledge allows a firm to better 
evaluate the potential of innovations, a potential explanation for this finding is that with 
greater knowledge depth, firms are more acute in realizing the limitations and shortfalls 
of the innovations. While deep knowledge may allow firms to perceive higher potential 
of certain innovations, it may also enable firms to recognize that certain innovations are 
limited in the possible exploitation and further extension. Given the fact that most 
innovations are incremental in improvement over currently available solutions and only 
have insignificant value, greater knowledge depth can enable firms discern innovations 
that do not pose high potential. In addition, deeper knowledge in an area also implies that 
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the firm has more solutions (thus more options) available in that area so that the marginal 
gains of new solutions is relatively less, and the firm will be more cautious in having 
more options in the area. In addition, having new options implies the firm may need to 
divert resources from current options thus the value of current options decreases 
(McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). Therefore greater knowledge depth makes firms become 
stricter with the valuation of innovations in the technological area rather than the opposite, 
helping firms abandon such innovations more ruthlessly. To conclude, this opposite 
finding does not imply that the real options argument is not reflected in the data. Rather, 
it actually offers evidence that managers act in accord with the real options reasoning by 
considering the future potential of the innovations, only that deeper knowledge helps to 
better screen innovations that are less promising. 
 
VI. 3. Additional findings 
A closer look at the results regarding scope of patent application and patent 
claims also reveals some important and interesting insights. Past research on patents often 
use two types of measures for patent scope, the number of patent classes or subclasses, 
and claims of patents. From a theoretical point of view, a patent‘s number of classes and 
claims reflect different aspects of the patent. Which class or classes a patent is assigned 
into is determined by the patent examination officials and thus is externally validated. 
The claims are made by the inventors prior to the patent grant, as an ex ante estimation 
based on the inventors‘ judgment of the inventive contribution. In the U.S., claims appear 
on the main page of the patent identified with the lead words: ―I claim….‖. The patent 
claims thus represent the initial expectation of the patent value before the patent grant 
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process as anticipated by the inventors rather than the patent officials. This comparison 
suggests that a patents‘ number of classes is more appropriate as an objective measure for 
its scope. The correlation between the two variables as shown in Table 4 is only 0.0533 
(p<0.05). In the logistic regression models on patent abandonment likelihood, the 
coefficient signs for the two variables are also opposite: while the number of claims is 
consistently negatively associated with the abandonment likelihood in the reported 
models, the class number is positively related with the likelihood to abandon the patent. 
This further confirms that the number of claims does not capture the same component of 
application scope as does the number of patent classes. 
The findings regarding self-citations and non-self citations are also worth 
discussion. The correlation between the two variables is low, 0.1404 (p< 0.05) and they 
have different effects on patent abandonment likelihood. While non-self citation 
consistently has a significant negative impact on abandonment likelihood, self-citation is 
only significant in the full model at a low significance level. This confirms the argument 
that self-citation and non-self citation have different meanings and that researchers 
should be aware of this when using patent citations in research. The finding also suggests 
that at least in the context of innovation abandonment, firms do not exhibit strong bias 
because of sunk cost. 
In order to better understand these findings, I compared them with Li & Hesterley 
(2006) and Nerkar & MacMillan (2004). Both used empirical settings different from my 
study. Li & Hesterley (2006) only examined patents that are abandoned, either in the first 
renewal round (at the end of the 4
th
 year) or those patents renewed in the first round but 
abandoned in the second renewal round (at the end of the 8
th
 year). They sampled patents 
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granted to U.S. manufacturing firms (SIC between 2000 and 3999) in 1995 and 
abandoned in 1999 or 2003. Then they looked at the relationship between their predictor 
variables and the timing the patents are abandoned. Nerkar & MacMillan (2004) only 
sampled patents granted in 1995 and in the pharmaceutical classes of 514 (Drugs) and 
424 (Bio affecting compositions) as defined by USPTO. They looked at how the 
experiential learning and learning from others influences the patent renewal decisions, 
individually and jointly. The use of different dependent variables and the sample 
selection difference between my study and these studies may explain the partial 
consistence of the findings.  
 
VI. 4. Implications 
The findings in this dissertation suggest that real options factors are significantly 
considered in making abandonment decisions. The real options variables utilized in this 
study help to assess the value of the focal innovation in a more comprehensive way than 
if only current earnings are considered. As the full model offers the best fit, we can 
conclude that real options theory provides a framework of broader perspective that can 
incorporate NPV, behavioral theory and the future growth potential of investment when 
there is considerable uncertainty.  
Researchers argue that the real option lens sheds economic insight onto the flaws 
in the behavioral processes that emerge in many firms, and offers guidance for better 
strategic decision making (McGrath et al, 2004). The findings of a strong and significant 
relationship between real options variables and abandonment decisions suggest a need to 
empirically investigate the relationship between real options reasoning and abandonment 
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decision outcomes. Thus the findings suggest further research opportunities. By 
empirically testing for the ―best fit‖ model from among the alternative perspectives, we 
are only able to discern the best explanation for what is actually happening in firms‘ 
managerial decisions, not what the optimal decision should be. Future study can advance 
further and examine the prescriptive potential of real options theory in strategic 
management by testing whether utilizing real options reasoning significantly improves 
decision making quality. For example, future research can look at whether firms should 
be more careful when abandoning innovations with wide scope and retain those 
innovations for a longer period of time. 
            The results of this study also have several other theoretical implications. First, this 
study has implications for real options research. It shows that managers use a real options 
perspective to help them decide when to change course. So far the majority of real 
options research in the field of strategy focuses on the initiation of new projects, which 
are viewed as the adoption of new options. Little research has been conducted on firms‘ 
implementation of real options perspective over time, such as the evaluation of 
previously acquired options and the decision to exercise or the decision to abandon. In 
fact, because abandonment decisions have been considered to be desperate and 
uncommon management decisions (Porter, 1976), the examination of abandonment 
decisions remains largely an unexplored territory in strategy research. In addition, 
regardless of the considerable scholarly attention and the promising potential of real 
options theory in strategy research, empirical study is still rather limited (McGrath and 
Nerkar, 2004). Especially, so far we still lack empirical evidence as to whether managers 
revise strategic decisions and abandon investments in accordance with real options theory. 
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By demonstrating how firms decide to terminate innovations in accordance with real 
options perspective, this study provides further support for and advances real options 
theory in the context of strategic management.  
Second, this study has implications for RBV and dynamic capability research. 
Firms undertake investments to develop and deploy their resources. Firms‘ dynamic 
capabilities involve not only the ability to incorporate certain processes into ongoing 
routines but also the ability to leave out certain processes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
However, most RBV research has focused on resource development and redeployment, 
and relatively few studies have examined how firms make discontinuation decisions, 
which are more complex and subjective than the decisions to continue. This study 
provides insight into how firms evaluate their investments and decide which to abandon, 
which is directly linked to the continuous development and renewing of firms‘ dynamic 
capabilities. Therefore this study helps to explain the sources of heterogeneity of 
organizational capabilities and to build a more dynamic resource-based view (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003). For example, research found that firms may fall into competency traps 
when favorable performance with an inferior procedure leads a firm to accumulate more 
experience with it thus keeping experience with a superior procedure inadequate to make 
it rewarding to use (Levitt and March, 1988). Such competency traps may cause firms to 
fail to conduct exploration or accumulate experience with new procedures. Real options 
theory, however, suggests that managers may appreciate the future growth potential of 
explorative procedures and conduct further experimentation and thus reduce the 
likelihood of falling into competency traps. Further, it is important for firms to both 
engage in exploring activities and also discontinue those projects and ventures that no 
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longer entail high potential early and cheaply to cut losses in time (McGrath et. al, 2006). 
This study shows that the real options perspective can shed insight on the balance 
between exploring projects and timely abandonment.  
            Third, this study shows that in the context of strategic management real options 
theory can be usefully tied with other strategy theories. In the development of hypotheses 
concerning the impact of knowledge depth and complementarity on firms‘ innovation 
abandonment decisions, I build my arguments based on real options theory and also other 
theories such as RBV, KBV and the dynamic capability view of the firm, taking into 
consideration of certain firm level factors. By combining the real options perspective 
with established strategy research we can apply real option reasoning to examine a wide 
range of strategic management issues and practices. For example, tying real options 
arguments with firms‘ resource development, accumulation and deployment, the learning 
aspect of knowledge and the development of organizational dynamic capabilities, we can 
gain new insights in firms‘ assessment of investment projects, their decisions concerning 
investment in resources and their R&D trajectory. In the mean time, linking real options 
theory with other strategy theories also furthers the advancement of real options theory.   
Fourth, it has implications for the innovation literature. Although the innovation 
literature has seen widespread attention to firm patents and patent characteristics, renewal 
or abandonment decision making so far remains a topic that is rarely explored. Thus, this 
study advances the understanding of managing an innovation portfolio by trimming the 
low value ones and keeping the promising ones. Specially, this study analyzes and tests 
how technological uncertainty impacts firms‘ innovation abandonment decisions. This is 
an essential feature of technological innovations but is inadequately addressed in 
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innovation literature. Past research has measured macroeconomic uncertainty by 
calculating the variance of indicators such as exchange rates (Campa, 1993), inflation and 
output prices (Huizinga, 1993); or industry-specific uncertainty as reflected in the 
volatility of sales (Kogut, 1991), stock market returns (Folta and Miller, 2002) or GDP 
contributions (Folta and O‘Brien, 2004). Relatively few studies explicitly examine the 
uncertainty a firm faces from technological sources. Although Folta (1998) proposed to 
examine technological uncertainty, empirically he operationalized the measure using 
stock market returns rather than examining the technologies themselves in a more direct 
way. 
Fifth, this study has implications for research on the management of firms‘ 
sequential investments. A firm‘s multi-stage projects require regular assessment and 
revision if necessary. This study expands our understanding of firms‘ revision of their 
investment decisions. Although the empirical test of this dissertation is conducted in the 
setting of innovation portfolio management, the same reasoning can apply to the 
valuation of multi-stage projects of other types. For example, the venture capital business 
is an appropriate context where uncertainty is high and the capability to terminate low-
potential projects is critical. We can expect that by adopting a real options perspective 
and considering factors associated with the projects‘ future potential such as uncertainty 
and interactions among the firm‘s other business investments, we can better predict 
firms‘ investment continuation and abandonment decisions.  
This study also has managerial implications for practitioners as it illustrates the 
impact of a series of factors on abandonment decisions. Managers may make use of the 
findings to facilitate the valuation of their ongoing investments, including innovations. 
 106 
Specifically, they should make sure to consider the growth potential embedded in firms‘ 
investments in addition to current earnings, especially the positive potential rooted in 
uncertainty and the interactions between the focal investment and the firms‘ other 
investments.    
             
VI. 5. Limitations and future research 
            This study also has several limitations. Although a single industry research design 
helps to alleviate the inter-industry differences, the generalizability of the findings to 
other industries is questionable. Replication of the research in other industries and 
different time frames is desirable. Industry characteristics may matter to the extent that 
real option reasoning is used. Industries vary in their reliance on patents. In industries 
where patents provide effective protection of technology, firms appropriate a significant 
portion of the value of their innovations. Therefore, firms can consider the total value 
potential of innovations for the society when making abandonment decisions. When the 
patent system and legislation provide weak protection from value appropriation by the 
firms with innovations, the firms need to consider the spillover variation. In using the real 
option lens, they need to consider the portion of upside potential that they may possibly 
appropriate, rather than the total potential of the innovation for the society. The impact of 
institutional environmental factors in other industries can be studied. 
          This study only examines the first renewal decision. Future studies can examine the 
subsequent renewal decisions, when more information is revealed and uncertainty 
resolves with time. The comparison of the decisions in these stages is going to be 
interesting. Future research can be extended to conduct longitudinal studies to examine 
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how the change in a firm‘s resources and capabilities influence its decisions. Studies can 
also examine whether those patented innovations renewed in the first round but 
abandoned later are worth the delay, what is the optimal timing of abandonment, and 
whether the real options argument may help firms make the abandonment decisions 
earlier without losing much of the growth option value.  
            This study raises a lot of interesting future research questions. The most important 
question is to further explore whether real options theory improves managerial decision 
making quality and lead to better performance. Although this study uses proxy for a 
firm‘s a priori perception, it does not perfectly capture the influence of escalation of 
commitment and other psychological factors. Future research can employ questionnaires 
to detect the impact of such factors and further rule out these influences. To look more 
closely, it is desirable to use surveys to test whether managers conscientiously use real 
option reasoning to evaluate investments and make the abandonment decisions or they do 
this sub-conscientiously. Future studies can also consider the possible interactions 
between the variables examined in the study and other variables at the patent level, firm 
level or industry level. 
            In this study I only examine the effect of uncertainty from the technological 
source, which is originated in the innovation generation process, leaving out the other 
possible types of uncertainty. Future studies can consider the impact of uncertainty from 
other sources, such as market demand, ownership structure, product market focus, 
technological relevance, and nationality or geographic locations.  
It is possible that firms tend to rely on real option reasoning to a greater extent in 
some situations than in others. I suspect that firm strategy, structure and resources are 
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likely to impact the extent that real option reasoning is used in organizational context. For 
example, we can question whether exploration-oriented firms are more likely to make 
innovation abandonment decisions in accord with real options theory. Competition and 
institutional factors may also impact the likelihood that real option reasoning is used. For 
example, does competitive rivalry positively moderate the use of real option reasoning, 
because growth option value is more valued when competition is intense? The 
characteristics of the top management team may also have influence on when growth 
option value is more recognized and emphasized. It is fruitful to conduct research on 
those contingencies under which the real option reasoning is more likely to be used. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Adner, R., Levinthal, D. 2004. What is not a real option: Considering boundaries for the 
application of real options to business strategy. Academy of Management Review, 29: 74-
85. 
 
Ahuja, G. 2000. Collaboration networks, structural holes, and innovation: A longitudinal 
study. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45: 425-455.  
 
Ahuja, G., Katila, R. 2001. Technological acquisitions and the innovation performance of 
acquiring firms: a longitudinal study. Strategic Management Journal, 22 (3):197-220., 
 
Ahuja, G., Lampert, CM. 2001.  Entrepreneurship in the large corporation. Strategic 
Management Journal, 22: 521-543. 
 
Albert, MB., Avery, D., Narin, F., McAllister, P. 1991. Direct validation of citation 
counts as indicators of industrially important patents. Research Policy, 20(3): 251-260.  
 
Arkes, H.t., Blumer, C. 1985. The psychology of sunk costs. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 35: 124-140 
 
Arundel, A., Kabla, I. 1998. What percentage of innovations are patented? Empirical 
estimates for European firms. Research Policy, 27: 127-141. 
 
 109 
Barney, J.B. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17: 99-120 
 
Basberg, BL. 1987. Patents and the measurement of technological change: A survey of 
the literature. Research Policy, 16: 131-141.   
 
Bean, AS. 1995. Why some R&D organizations are more productive than others. 
Research technology management, 1995 January-February. 25-29. 
 
Berger, P., Ofek, E., Swary, I. 1996. The valuation of the abandonment option. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 42: 257-287.  
 
Bettis, T., Hitt, M. 1995. The new competitive landscape. Strategic Management Journal, 
16: 7-20. 
 
Black, F., Scholes, M. 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of 
Political Economy, 81: 637-659. 
 
Block, Z., MacMillan, IC. 1993. Corporate venturing: creating new businesses within the 
firm. Harvard Business School Press: Boston, Mass 
 
Bogner, WC., Bansal, P. 2007. Knowledge Management as the Basis of Sustained High 
Performance. Journal of Management Studies, 44 (1): 165–188. 
 
Bogner, WC., Barr, PS., 2000. Making sense in hypercompetitive environments: a 
cognitive explanation for the persistence of high velocity competition. Organization 
Science. 11(2): 212-226. 
 
Bourgeois, III, L.J., Eisenhardt, K.M., 1988. Strategic decision processes in high velocity 
environments: four cases in the microcomputer industry. Management Science, 34: 816–
835. 
 
Bowman, E., Hurry, D. 1993. Strategy through the option lens: An integrated view of 
resource investments and the incremental-choice process. Academy of Management 
Review, 18: 760-782. 
 
Bowman, EH., Moskowitz, GT. 2001. Real options analysis and strategic decision 
making. Organization Science, 12(6): 772-777. 
 
Brockner, J., Rubin, J.Z., Lang, E. 1981. Face-saving and entrapment. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 17: 68-79 
 
Bromiley, P. 2005. The Behavioral Foundations of Strategic Management. Blackwell 
Publishing.  
 
 110 
Brown, S.L., Eisenhardt, K.M., 1997. The art of continuous change: linking complexity 
theory and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting organizations.  Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 42: 1 - 34 
 
Camerer, C.F., Lovallo, D. 1999. Overconfidence and excess entry: An experimental 
approach. American Economic Review, 89: 306-319. 
 
Campa, JM. 1993. Entry by foreign firms in the United States under exchange-rate 
uncertainty. Review of Economics and Statistics, 75(4): 614-622. 
 
Cannolly, RA., Hirschey, M. 1984. R&D, market structure and profits: a value-based 
approach. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 682-686. 
 
Carruth, A., Dickerson, A., Henley, A. 2000. What do we know about investment under 
uncertainty? Journal of Economic Surveys, 14(2): 119-153. 
 
Caves. R. 1998. Industrial organization and new findings on the turnover and mobility of 
firms. Journal of Economic Literature. 36: 1947-1982 
 
Chang, S. 1996. An evolutionary perspective on diversification and corporate  
restructuring. Strategic Management Journal, 17: 87-96. 
 
Chi, T. 2000. Option to acquire or divest a joint venture. Strategic Management Journal, 
21: 665-687. 
 
Christensen, C. 1997. The Innovator's Dilemma : When New Technologies Cause 
Great Firms to Fail. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press 
 
Cohen, W., Levinthal, D. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and 
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 128-152. 
 
Cohen, W., Levinthal, D. 1994. A fortune favors the prepared firm. Management Science, 
40: 227-251. 
 
Cohen, W., Levin, R. 1989. Empirical studies of innovation and market structure. 
Handbook of Industrial Organization Economics, Volume II, Elsevier Science Publishers: 
London, 1059-1107. 
 
Conlon, D.E., Garland, H. 1993. The role of project completion information in resource 
allocation decisions. Academy of Management Journal, 36: 402-413. 
 
Copeland, TE., Keenan, PT. 1998. How much is flexibility worth? Mckinsey Quart. 2 38-
49. 
 
Copeland, TE., Weston, JF. 1992. Financial theory and corporate policy. 3
rd
 Ed. 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.  
 111 
 
Cornelli, F., Schankerman, M. 1999. Patent renewals and R&D incentives. The Rand 
Journal of Economics, 30: 197-213. 
 
Cox, J., Ross, S., Rubinstein, M. 1979. Option pricing: a simplified approach. Journal of 
Financial Economics, September: 229-263. 
 
Crocker, J., Fiske, S.T., Taylor, S.E.1984. Schematic bases of belief change. In J.R. Eiser 
(Ed.), Attitudinal Judgment. New York: Springer-Verlag: 197-226 
 
Curley, S.P., Yates, J.F., Abrams, R.A. 1986. Psychological sources of ambiguity 
avoidance. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 38: 230-256. 
 
Cyert, R., March, J. 1963. A Behavior Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs. NJ: 
Prentice-Hall 
 
Dixit, A. 1992. Investment and hysteresis. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6: 107-132.  
 
Dixit, AK., Pindyck, RS. 1994. Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton University 
Press: Princeton, NJ. 
 
Duhaime, I.M., Grant, J.H., 1984. Factors influencing divestment decision making: 
evidence from a field study. Strategic Management Journal, 15: 301-318 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments. 
Academy of Management Journal, 32: 543-576, 
 
Eisenhardt, K., Martin, J., 2000. Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic 
Management Journal, 21: 1105-1121. 
 
Eisenhardt, KM., Tabrizi, BN. 1995. Accelerating adaptive processes: Product innovation 
in the global computer industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 84-110. 
 
Ellsberg, D. 1961. Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 75: 336-342. 
 
Ferrier, W., Smith, K., Grimm, C. 1999. The role of competitive action in market share 
erosion and industry dethronement: A study of industry leaders and challenger. Academy 
of Management Journal, 42: 372-388. 
 
Fiske, S.T., Taylor, S.E. 1984. Social Cognition. 2
nd
 E.D. McGraw-Hill.   
 
Fleming, L. 2001. Recombinant Uncertainty in Technological Search. Management 
Science, 47: 17-32. 
 
 112 
Fleming, L., Sorenson, O. 2001. Technology as a Complex Adaptive System: Evidence 
from Patent Data. Research Policy 30: 1019-1039 
 
Folta, TB. 1998. Governance and uncertainty: the trade-off between administrative 
control and commitment. Strategic Management Journal, 11: 1007-1028. 
 
Folta, TB., O‘Brien, JP. 2004. Entry in the presence of dueling options. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25: 121-138.   
 
Folta, TB., O‘Brien, JP. 2007. Real options and Exit: the critical moderating roles of sunk 
costs & strategy. Working paper presented at Academy of Management, Philadelphia.  
 
Folta, TB., Miller, KD. 2002. Real options in equity partnerships. Strategic Management 
Journal, 23: 77-88. 
 
Franko, LG. 1989. Global corporate competition: who‘s winning, who‘s losing, and the 
R&D factor as one reason why. Strategic Management Journal, V10, 449-474. 
 
Gallini NT., Wright, BD. 1990. Technology-Transfer under asymmetric information. 
Rand Journal of Economics. 21(1): 147-160 
 
Garland, H. 1990. Throwing good money after bad: The effect of sunk costs on the 
decision to escalate commitment to an ongoing project. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
75: 728-731. 
 
Garud R., Van de Ven, AH. 1992. An empirical evaluation of the internal corporate 
venturing process. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 93-109.  
 
Geroski P., Machin, S., Reenan, J. 1993. The profitability of innovation firms. RAND 
Journal of Economics, 24: 198-211. 
 
Geroski, PA. 1989. Entry, innovation and productivity growth. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 572-578. 
 
Gimeno, J., Folta, T., Cooper, A., Woo, C. 1997. Survival of the fittest? Entrepreneurial 
human capital and the persistence of underperforming firms. Administrative Science 
Quarterly. 42: 750-783 
 
Goto, A., Suzuki, K. 1989. R&D capital, rate of return to R&D investment and spillover 
of R&D in Japanese manufacturing industries. Review of Economics and Statistics, 4: 
555-564. 
 
Grandstand, O., Patel, P., Pavitt, K. 1997. Multi-technology corporations: Why they have 
―distributed‖ rather than ―distinctive core‖ competencies. California Management Review, 
39: 8-25. 
 
 113 
Grant, R. 1996. Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: Organizational 
capability as knowledge integration. Organization Science, 7: 375-387. 
 
Greve, H. 2003. A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations: evidence 
from shipbuilding. Academy of Management Journal, 46: 685-702. 
 
Griliches, Z. 1990. Patent statistics as economic indicators: a survey. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 28(4): 1661-1707. 
 
Grindley, PC., Teece, DJ. 1997. Managing intellectual capital: Licensing and cross-
licensing in semiconductors and electronics. California Management Review 39(2):8-41 
 
Guiso L., Parigi, G. 1999. Investment and demand uncertainty. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 114(1): 185-227. 
 
Guler I. 2007a. Throwing good money after bad? Political and institutional influences on 
sequential decision making in the venture capital industry. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 52: 248-285. 
 
Guler I. 2007b. An empirical examination of management of real options in the U.S. 
venture capital industry. Real Options Theory in Advances in Strategic Management, 24, 
485-506. 
 
Hall, B.H., Jaffe, A., Trajtenberg, M. 2001. The NBER patent citations data file: lessons, 
insights and methodological tools. 
 
Hamel, G., Prahalad, C.K. 2005. Strategic Intent. Harvard Business Review, 83:148-161 
 
Hayley, G., Goldberg, S. 1995. Net present value techniques and their effects on new 
product research. Industrial Marketing Management,. 24:177-190. 
 
Helfat, C. 1994. Firm-specificity in corporate applied R&D. Organization Science, 5: 
173-184.  
 
Helfat, C. 1997. Know-how and asset complementarity and dynamic capability 
accumulation: the case of R&D. Strategic Management Journal, 18 (5): 339-360 
 
Helfat, C. 2000. Guest Editors‘ introduction to the Special Issue: Evolution of firm 
capabilities. Strategic Management Journal, Summer Special Issue 21 (10-11): 955-959. 
 
Helfat, C., Eisenhardt, K. 2004. Inter-temporal economies of scope, organizational 
modularity, and the dynamics of diversification. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 
1217-1232. 
 
Helfat, C., Peteraf, M.A. 2003. The dynamic resource-based view: capability lifecycles. 
Strategic Management Journal, 24: 997-1010. 
 114 
 
Henderson, R. 1995. Of life cycles real and imaginary: The unexpectedly long lod age of 
optical lithography. Research Policy, 24: 631-643.  
 
Henderson, R., Clark, K. 1990. Architectural innovation: The reconfiguration of existing 
product technologies and the failure of established firms. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 35: 9-30. 
 
Herderson, R., Cockburn, I. 1996. Scale, scope, and spillovers: The determinants of 
research productivity in drug discovery. The Rand Journal of Economics, 27: 32-59. 
 
Herderson, R., Jaffe, A., Trajtenberg, M. 2005. Patent citations and the geography of 
knowledge spillovers: a reassessment: comment. The American Economic Review, 95: 
461-466. 
 
Hoskison, RA., Hitt, MA., Ireland, D. 1994. The effects of acquisitions and restructuring 
(strategic refocusing) strategies on innovation. In The Management of Corporate 
Acquisitions: International Perspectives, Von Krogh G, Sinatra A, Singh H (eds). 
Macmillan: Houndmills; 144-169. 
 
Hoskisson, R., Hitt, M., Hill, CWL. 1993. Managerial incentives and investment in R&D 
in large multi-product firms. Organization Science, 4(2): 325-341. 
 
Huber, G. 1991. Organizational learning: The contributing processes and a review of the 
literatures. Organization Science, 2: 88-115. 
 
Hurry, D., Miller, A., Bowman, E. 1992. Calls on high-technology: Japanese exploration 
of venture investments in the United States. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 85-101. 
 
Huizinga, J. 1993. Inflation uncertainty, relative price uncertainty, and investment in 
United States manufacturing. Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 25(3): 521-549. 
 
Ingersoll, JE., Ross, SA. 1992. "Waiting to Invest: Investment and Uncertainty," Journal 
of Business, (January): 1-29. 
 
Jaffe, AB., Trajtenberg, M., Henderson, R. 1993. Geographic localization of knowledge 
spillovers as evidenced by patent citations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3): 577-
598. 
 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47: 263-290. 
 
Katila, R. 2002. New product search over time: Past ideas in their prime? Academy of 
Management Journal, 45: 995-1010. 
 
 115 
Katila, R., Ahuja, G. 2002. Something old, something new: a longitudinal study of search 
behavior and new product introduction. Academy of Management Journal, 45. No. 6. 
1183-1194. 
 
Kester, WC. 1984. Today‘s options for tomorrow‘s growth. Harvard Business Review, 
62(2): 153-160 
 
Kim, D-J., Kogut, B. 1996. Technological platforms and diversification. Organization 
Science, 7: 283-301. 
 
Knez, P., Smith, V.L., Williams, A.W. 1985. Individual rationality, market rationality, 
and value estimation. American Economic Review, 75: 397-402.  
 
Kogut, B., 1989. A note on global strategies. Strategic Management Journal. 10(4): 383-
389. 
 
Kogut, B., 1991. Joint ventures and the option to expand and acquire. Management 
Science, 37: 19-33. 
 
Kogut, B., Kulatilaka. N. 1994. Options thinking and platform investments: investing in 
opportunity. California Management Review, 36(2): 52-71. 
 
Kogut, B., Kulatilaka. N. 2001. Capabilities as real options. Organization Science, 123(6): 
744-758. 
 
Kogut, B., Zander, U. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the 
replication of technology. Organization Science, 3: 383-397. 
 
Huchzermeier, A., Cohen, MA. 1996. Valuing operational flexibility under exchange rate 
risk. Operations Research. 44(1): 100-113.  
 
Kulatilaka N., Perotti, E. 1998. Strategic growth option. Management Science,. 44: 1021-
1031. 
 
Kumar MVS., 2005. The value from acquiring and divesting a joint venture: a real 
options approach. Strategic Management Journal. 26(4): 321-331 
 
Kumar, M., Shyam, V.  2005.  ―The value from acquiring and divesting a joint venture: a 
real options approach.‖  Strategic Management Journal 26(4): 321-331 
 
Kutner, M., Nachtsheim, C., Neter, J. 2004. Applied Linear Regression Models. 4th 
edition, McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
 
Lander, DM., Pinches, GE. 1998. Challenges to the practical implementation of modeling 
and valuing real options. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 38 (3-2): 537-567. 
 
 116 
Lanjouw. J.O., Schankerman, M. 2001. Characteristics of patent litigation: a window on 
competition. Rand Journal of Economics. 32(1): 129-151 
 
Lanjouw. J.O., 1998. Patent protection in the shadow of infringement: Simulation 
estimations of patent value. The Review of Economic Studies, 65: 671-710. 
 
Lanjouw. J.O., Pakes, A., Putnam, J. 1998. How to count patents and value intellectual 
property: the use of patent renewal and application data. The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 46: 405-432. 
 
Laudan, R. 1984. The nature of technological knowledge: are models of scientific change 
relevant? Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Co. 
 
Lee, H., Smith, K., Grimm, C., Schomburg, A. 2000. Timing, order and durability of new 
product advantages with imitation, Strategic Management Journal, 21: 23-30. 
 
Leonard-Barton, D. 1992. Core capabilities and core rigidities: a paradox in managing 
new product development. Strategic Management Journal, Summer Special Issue 13: 
111-125. 
 
Lerner, J. 1994. The importance of patent scope: an empirical analysis. Rand Journal of 
Economics, 25: 319-333. 
 
Levin, RA., Klevorick, A,. Nelson, R., Winter, S. 1987. Appropriating the returns from 
industrial research and development. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3: 783-831. 
 
Levinthal, D.A., March, J.G., 1993. The myopia of learning. Strategic Management 
Journal, 14: 95-112.  
 
Levitt, B., March, JG. 1988. Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology, 14: 
319-340. 
 
Li, S., Hesterly, W. 2004. Real option or real ‗option trap‘? Examining the application of 
real option reasoning in determining patent abandonment timing. Working paper. 
 
Lowe, R., Veloso, F. 2004. Patently wrong? Firm strategy and the decision to disband 
technological assets. Working paper. 
 
MacMillan, IC., McGrath, RG.  2002.  Crafting R&D project portfolios.  Research 
Technology Management, 45: 48-60. 
 
MacMillan, IC., Putten, AB.v., McGrath, R.G., Thompson, JD. 2006. Using Real Options 
Discipline for Highly Uncertain Technology Investments. Research Technology 
Management, 49(1): 29-38.  
 
Mahoney, J.T., 2005. Economic Foundations of Strategy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
 117 
 
Mahoney, J.T., Pandian, J.R. 1992. The resource-based view within the conversation of 
strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 363-380. 
 
Makadok, R. 1998. Can first-mover and early-mover advantages be sustained in an industry 
with low barriers to entry/imitation? Strategic Management Journal, 19: 683-696 
 
March, JG,. Simon, HA. 1958. Organizations. McGraw-Hill. New York. 
 
March, J. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization 
Science, 2: 71-87. 
 
McDonald, R., Siegel, D. 1986. The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 101(4): 707-727. 
 
McGrath, RG. 1997. A real options logic for initiating technology positioning 
investments. Academy of Management Review, 22: 974-996. 
 
McGrath, RG. 1999. Falling forward: Real option reasoning and entrepreneurial failure.  
Academy of Management Review, 24: 13-30. 
 
McGrath, RG., Keil, T., Tukiainen, T. 2006. Extracting value from corporate venturing. 
MIT Sloan Management Review, 48(1): 50-56 
 
McGrath RG., Nerkar, A. 2004. Real options reasoning and a new look at the R&D 
investment strategies of pharmaceutical firms. Strategic Management Journal, 24: 1-21. 
 
McGrath, R., Ferrier, W., Mendelow, A. 2004. Real options as engines of choice and 
heterogeneity. Academy of Management Review, 29: 86-101. 
 
McNamara, G., Moon, H., Bromiley, P. 2002. Banking on commitment: intended and 
unintended consequences of an organization‘s attempt to attenuate escalation of 
commitment. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 443-452 
 
McNamara, R.S., VanDeMark, B. 1995. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of 
Vietnam. New York: Times Books. 
 
Miller, KD., Arikan, A. 2004. ―Technology search investments: evolutionary, option 
reasoning, and option Pricing Approaches.‖ Strategic Management Journal, 25: 473-485. 
 
Miller, K. 1998. Economic exposure and integrated risk management. Strategic 
Management Journal, 19(5): 497-514. 
 
Mitchell, GR., Hamilton, WF. 1988. Managing R-and-D as a strategic option. Research 
Technology Management, 31(3): 15-22. 
 
 118 
Mobey, G. 1988. R&D: Its relationship to company performance. Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, 5: 191-200. 
 
Morck, R., & Yeung, B. 1991. Why Investors Value Multinationality. Journal of 
Business, 64(2): 165-187. 
 
Moore, W., 1994. Radical innovations: What can be learned from the past? In And Now 
for Something Completely Different: ―Really‖ New Products, M. Adams, and J. LaCugna, 
Eds., Marketing Science Institute Conference Summary #94-124.  
 
Myers, SC. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 
5:147-175 
 
Myers, SC. 1984. Finance theory and financial strategy. Interfaces, 14: 126-137 
 
Myers, S.C., Majd, S. 1990. "Abandonment Value and Project Life," Advances in Futures 
and Options Research. 1-21.  
 
Nelson, R. 1961. Uncertainty, learning and the economics of parallel research and 
development efforts. Review of Economics and Statistics, 43: 351-364. 
 
Nelson, R., Winter, S. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press. 
 
Nerkar A., MacMillan, IC. 2004. Giving up sources of potential competitive advantage: 
the role of learning in the abandonment of real options. Working paper. 
 
Nerkar, A., Paruchuri, s., Khaire, M. 2007. Business Methods Patents as Real Options: 
Value and Disclosure as Drivers of Litigation. Real Options Theory in Advances in 
Strategic Management, 24: 247-274. 
 
Pakes, A. 1986. Patents as options: some estimates of the value of holding European 
patent stocks. Econometrica, 54: 755-784. 
 
Pakes, A., Schankerman, M. 1984. The rate of obsolescence of knowledge, research 
gestation lags, and the private rate of return to research resources. In Z. Griliches, ed., 
R&D, Patents, and Productivity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
 
Porter, M. 1976. Please note location of nearest exit: Exit barriers and planning. 
Califormia Management Review, 19(2): 21-33. 
 
Porter, M. 1996. What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, 74: 61-78. 
 
Putten, AB.v, MacMillan, IC., 2004. Making real options really work. Harvard Business 
Review. 82(12): 134-141 
 
 119 
Rendleman, RJJ., Bartter, BJ.. 1979. Two-state option pricing. Journal of Finance, 34: 
1093-1110. 
 
Reuer, JJ., Leiblein, MJ. 2000. Downside risk implications of multinationality and 
international joint ventures. Academy of Management Journal, 43: 203-214. 
 
Reuer, J.J., Tong, T.W. 2005. Real Options in International Joint Ventures. Journal of 
Management, 31: 403-423. 
 
Roberts, P. 1999. Product innovation, product-market competition and persistent 
profitability in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 655-
670. 
 
Rosenberg, N. 1994. Exploring the Black Box. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
MA. 
 
Rosenkopf, L., Nerkar, A. 2001. Beyond local search: Boundary spanning, exploration 
and impact in the optical disk industry. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 287-306. 
 
Ross, S. 1995. Uses, abuses, and alternatives to the Net-Present-Value Rule. Financial 
Management, 24, 96-102 . 
 
Ross, J., Staw, B.M. 1993. Organizational escalation and exit: lessons from the Shoreham 
Nuclear Power Plan. Academy of Management Journal, 36: 701-732 
 
Sahal, D. 1985. Technological guideposts and innovation avenues. Research Policy, 14: 
61-82  
 
Schumpeter, J. 1939. Business Cycles: A Theoretical and Statistical Analysis of the 
Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Schumpeter, J. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper & Row: New York 
Schankerman, M., 1998. How valuable is patent protection? Estimates by technology 
field. Rand Journal of Economics, 29: 77-107. 
 
Schankerman, M., Pakes, A. 1986. Estimates of the value of patent rights in European 
countries during the post-1950 period. The Economic Journal, 96: 1052-1076. 
 
Scotchmer, S., 1999. On the optimality of the patent renewal system. The Rand Journal 
Economics, 30: 181-196. 
 
Shane, S., 2001. Technological opportunities and new firm creation. Management 
Science. 47(2): 205-220. 
 
Siggelkow, N. 2002. Evolution toward fit. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47: 125-159. 
 
 120 
Simon, H.A. 1982.  Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business 
Organization. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
 
Simon, HA. 1991. Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning. Organization 
Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, Special Issue: 125-134. 
 
Slater, FS., Reddy, VK., Zwirlein, TJ. 1998. Evaluating strategic investments. Industrial 
Marketing Management, 27: 447-458. 
 
Smith, V.L. 1989. Theory, experiment and economics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
3: 151-169. 
 
Somaya, D. 2003. Strategic determinants of decisions not to settle patent litigation. 
Strategic Management Journal. 24(1): 17-38 
 
Sorenson, J., Stuart, T. 2000. Aging, obsolescence, and organizational innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 45: 81-112. 
 
Staw, B.M. 1976. Knee-deep in the big muddy: A study of escalating commitment to a 
chosen course of action. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16: 27-44. 
 
Staw, BM. 1981. The escalation of commitment to a chosen course of action. Academy of 
Management Review, 6: 577-587. 
 
Staw, BM. 1993. Organizational escalation and exit: lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear 
Power Plan. Academy of Management Journal, 36: 701-732. 
 
Staw, B.M., Fox, F. 1977. Escalation: Some determinants of commitment to a previously 
chosen course of action. Human Relations, 30: 431-450. 
 
Staw, B.M., Hoang, H. 1995. Sunk costs in the NBA: Why draft order affects playing 
time and survival in professional basketball. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 474-
494. 
 
Staw, B.M., Ross, J. 1978. Commitment to a policy decision: A multitheoretical 
perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly. 23: 40-64. 
 
Staw, B.M., Ross, J. 1980. Commitment in an experimenting society: An experiment on 
the attribution of leadership from administrative scenarios. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 65: 249-260. 
 
Staw, B.M., Barsade, S.G., Koput, K.W. 1997. Escalation at the credit window: a 
longitudinal study of bank executives' recognition and write-off of problem loans. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 82: 130-142. 
 
 121 
Stein, J. 1996. Rational capital budgeting in an irrational world. Journal of Business, 69: 
429-455. 
 
Strebel, P.J. 1983. The stock market and competitor analysis. Strategic Management 
Journal, 4: 279-291. 
 
Sullivan, R.J. 1994. Estimates of the value of patent rights in Great Britain and Ereland, 
1852-1876. Economica, 61: 37-58. 
 
Taylor, S.E., Brown, J.D. 1988. Illusion and well-being: A social psychological 
perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103: 193–210 
 
Teece, D.J. 1998. Capturing value from knowledge assets: The new economy, markets 
for know-how, and intangible assets. California Management Review. 40(3): 55-79 
 
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G., Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18: 509-533. 
 
Teger, A.I. 1979. Too much invested to quit: the psychology of the escalation of conflict. 
New York: Pergamon. 
 
Thaler, R. 1980. Towards a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 1: 39-60. 
 
Thompson, P., Fox-Kean, M. 2005. Patent citations and the geography of knowledge 
spillovers: a reassessment. American Economic Review, 95: 450-560. 
 
Tong, XS., Frame, JD. 1994. Measuring national technological performance with patent 
claims data. Research Policy 23(2): 133-141 
 
Tong, TW., Reuer, JJ., Peng, MW. 2005. International joint ventures and the value of 
growth options. Working paper. 
 
Ton, TW., Reuer, JJ. 2007. Real options in multinational corporations: organizational 
challenges and risk implications. Journal of International Business Studies, 38: 215-230  
 
Tranjetnberg, M. 1990. A penny for your quotes: patent citations and the value of 
information. RAND Journal of Economics, 21: 172-187. 
 
Trajtenberg, M., Jaffe, A., Henderson, R. 1997. University versus corporate patents: A 
window on the basicness of invention. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 
5(1): 19-50 (1994) 
 
Trigeorgis, L. 1993. Real options and interactions with financial flexibility. Financial 
Management, 22(3): 202-224.  
 
 122 
Trigeorgis, L. 1996. Real Options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource 
Allocation. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.  
 
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. 1974. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice, 
Science, 185: 1124-1131. 
 
Utterback, J. 1994. Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation. Harvard Business School 
Press: Boston, MA. 
 
Vassolo, RS., Anandl, J., Folta, TB. 2004. Non-additivity in portfolios of exploration 
activities: a real options-based analysis of equity alliances in biotechnology. Strategic 
Management Journal, 25: 1045-1061. 
 
Warner AG., Fairbank, JF., Steensma, HK. 2006. Managing uncertainty in a formal 
standards-based industry: a real options perspective on acquisition timing. Journal of 
Management, vol. 32: 279 - 298. 
 
Weick, K.E. 1995. Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
 
Weinsten, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 5: 806-820. 
 
Whyte, G. 1986. Escalating commitment to a course of action: A reinterpretation. 
Academy of Management Review, 11: 311-321 
 
Zahra, S.A, George, G., 2002. Absorptive capacity: a review, reconceptualization, and 
extension. Academy of Management Review, 27(2): 185-203. 
